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ABSTRACT 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States were the impetus for change within 
the U.S. homeland security establishment.  Despite these changes, deficiencies still exist.  
In addition to these deficiencies, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is in full swing 
and the United States is engaged around the world.  These factors provide valid reasons 
for the United States to research other countries’ homeland security paradigms to provide 
a contrast in methods of combating terrorism.  This thesis investigates the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks and the U.S. reactions in response to these attacks.  As a country that has 
combated terrorism in the past, Japan’s experiences with the Japanese Red Army (JRA) 
and Aum Shinrikyo, indigenous terrorist groups, are elucidated.  The U.S. responses to 
9/11 are compared to Japan’s responses to the JRA, Aum Shinrikyo and 9/11.  These 
comparisons are analyzed and used to describe the Japanese homeland security paradigm.  
This paradigm is applied to the U.S. strategy to combat terrorism to identify aspects of 
U.S. strategy that should be improved by implementing the Japanese homeland security 
paradigm.  This thesis was written in the hope that the United States can learn from 
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On September 11, 2001, the United States suffered through terrorist attacks that 
used airliners as weapons to destroy the World Trade Center towers and severely 
damaged the Pentagon.  This event launched the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) that 
is still being waged as this thesis is being written.  While the 9/11 attacks on the United 
States were horrible, it is not the only country in the world to experience terrorist attacks.  
In Asia, several countries have suffered terrorist attacks.  Jemaah Islamiah (JI) killed 202 
people in its 2002 attack in Bali, Indonesia and killed another 26 people in the 2005 Bali 
bombings.1  Terrorists killed at least 174 people in 2006 by a series of seven bombings in 
Mumbai, India.  These are just the latest terrorist attacks that India has faced.2  Abu 
Sayyaf terrorists bombed a ferry in 2004 that killed 100 or more passengers in the 
Philippines.3  Japan has suffered since the 1960s from attacks by the Japanese Red Army 
(JRA) and Aum Shinrikyo. 
With the GWOT currently in full swing, the deficiencies that still exist in the U.S. 
homeland security systems merit an objective review.  In this situation, it may be 
instructive to analyze other countries’ experiences with combating terrorism.  Despite 
cultural differences, the Japanese homeland security paradigm presents an opportunity for 
comparison and contrast vis-à-vis the American model.  Like the United States, Japan is a 
democracy and a global economic power.  Similarly, Japan has experienced terrorist 
attacks both domestically and internationally.  Even though the leaders of Japan have 
been constrained by their constitution in pursuing a global war against terrorism, they 
were able to use international police cooperation and economic aid as instruments of 
national power in their battle against terrorism.4  In addition to international police 
                                                 
1 CNN, “Bali terrorist blasts kill at least 26,” 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/10/01/bali.blasts/index.html (accessed August 25, 2006). 
2 CNN, “At least 174 killed in Indian train blasts,” 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/07/11/mumbai.blasts/index.html (accessed August 25, 2006). 
3 Simon Elegant, “The Return of Abu Sayyaf,” Time Asia Edition, 
http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/article/0,13673,501040830-686107,00.html (accessed August 25, 
2006). 
4 Peter J. Katzenstein, “September 11 in Comparative Perspective,” International Organization, Spring 
(2002): 48. 
2 
cooperation and economic aid, Japan’s domestic policing policies are also significant.5  
The United States recognizes the importance of these instruments in the U.S. National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism.  International police cooperation, economic aid and 
domestic policing are key components of both U.S. and Japanese policy and merit 
applying the Japanese homeland security paradigm to the United States. 
This thesis will review the 9/11 attacks on the United States and the terrorist 
threat that was posed by the Japanese Red Army and Aum Shinrikyo to Japan.  The 
responses by both countries to these terrorists will be compared and the Japanese 
homeland security paradigm will be elucidated.  This paradigm will be applied to the 
United States in the hope that it can learn from another country’s successes and failures 
in combating terrorism.   
B. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized into seven chapters.  Chapter II evaluates the 9/11 
terrorist attacks on the United States.  Included in this assessment is an analysis of the 
U.S. perspective on Asia’s role in terrorism pre-9/11 and post-9/11.  Following this 
analysis, pre-9/11 terrorism against the United States and the missed opportunities in 
preventing it are investigated.  These missed opportunities are compared to the 9/11 
missed opportunities after reviewing the background of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the 
missed opportunities in preventing it.  Based off of pre-9/11 and 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 
future terrorist threats that the United States may face is elucidated.  Chapter II provides 
the background against which Japan’s experiences are compared. 
Chapter III provides an examination of two terrorist groups that originated in Japan, the 
Japanese Red Army (JRA) and Aum Shinrikyo, and investigates Japan’s historical 
experiences with terrorism.   The activities of each terrorist group are presented to 
provide the background necessary to investigate the Japanese responses to each group. 
Chapter IV is a comparison of the U.S. and Japanese responses to terrorists.  The 
U.S. response is to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, while the Japanese responses are to the JRA, 
Aum Shinrikyo, and 9/11.  Japanese responses to other terrorists threats are also 
examined. 
                                                 
5 Katzenstein, 53. 
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Chapter V presents the Japanese homeland security paradigm.  This paradigm 
consists of the successful and unsuccessful responses that Japan has used in its battle 
against terrorism.  Japan’s perception of their homeland security paradigm is analyzed as 
well as how the paradigm applies to other terrorist threats in Asia. 
Chapter VI elucidates the deficiencies that existed in the U.S. responses to the 
9/11 attacks.  Deficiencies in the U.S. responses highlight the need for the United States 
to research other countries’ paradigms.  Therefore, the Japanese homeland security 
paradigm is applied to the U.S. strategy for combating terrorism. 
Chapter VII examines U.S. priorities and strategy for combating terrorism and 
claims made by the Bush administration that measure progress in homeland security.  
Although the administration claims that progress is being made, problems with measuring 
counterterrorism progress raise doubts about these claims.  In light of this dilemma, the 



























II. 9/11 TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE UNITED STATES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The 9/11 attacks on the United States have perhaps been the most investigated 
terrorist attacks ever against the country.  This chapter analyzes the U.S. perception of 
Asia’s role in terrorism, both pre-9/11 and post-9/11.  It also investigates U.S. 
experiences with terrorism before 9/11 and analyzes the missed opportunities that might 
have prevented these events.  Following the pre-9/11 analysis, this chapter also analyzes 
the 9/11 terrorist plot and the missed opportunities confronted by the U.S. homeland 
security establishment to stop the attacks.  The pre-9/11 missed opportunities are 
compared to the 9/11 missed opportunities.  U.S. experiences with terrorism are used to 
assess the future terrorist threat that the United States may face.  This information will be 
used to provide background for assessing the U.S. response to the 9/11 attacks in Chapter 
IV. 
B. ASIA’S ROLE IN TERRORISM 
The U.S. perception of Asia’s role in terrorism can be determined by examining 
the emphasized items in the State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism for 2000 
(pre-9/11) and 2005 (post-9/11). 
U.S. perceptions of terrorism in Asia, pre-9/11, focused primarily on the trend of 
terrorism shifting from the Middle East to South Asia as the Taliban was providing a safe 
haven to terrorists in Afghanistan.  Northeast Asia was recognized for efforts against 
terrorism, while Southeast Asia was perceived as a growing threat with terrorist groups 
active in Indonesia and Philippines.6 
A post-9/11 look at U.S. perceptions of terrorism in Asia shows a much greater 
concern with terrorist activities in that region.  South Asia is most likely perceived as the 
greatest threat as it received its own chapter and efforts in Pakistan and Afghanistan 
receiving the most priority.7  Southeast Asia is also recognized as being extremely 
                                                 
6 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism – 2000: Asia Overview, April 2001, 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2000/2432.htm (accessed August 26, 2006). 
7 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism – 2005: South Asia Overview, April 2006, 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64345.htm (accessed August 26, 2006). 
6 
important in GWOT with regional terrorist groups, such as Jemaah Islamiah, being 
primary concerns.  The governments of Southeast Asia are recognized for their efforts as 
reliable partners in GWOT.  East Asian countries and Australia are recognized for their 
progress against terrorism.8 
C. PRE-9/11 TERRORISM AND MISSED OPPORTUNITIES 
El Sayyid Nosair, a 35-year-old Egyptian-born militant, assassinated Rabbi Meir 
Kahane, the 58-year-old founder of the Jewish Defense League and former member of 
the Israeli Parliament, in 1990.9  After the Kahane assassination, Neil Herman, a 
supervisor of an elite group of FBI agents and New York police officers called the Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), reflected that it appeared obvious that Nosair was part of a 
larger movement and that the FBI needed to make an aggressive attack on terrorism.  
However, jurisdiction issues meant that the investigation would belong to the New York 
Police Department (NYPD).10  On February 26, 1993, the first World Trade Center 
bombing occurred.  In the final days leading up to this attack, the JTTF was “just a 
whisper away from the World Trade Center plot,” but their investigation was killed for 
administrative reasons.11  On April 19, 1995, the Oklahoma City bombing occurred.  
According to the “Final Report on the Bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building April 
19, 1995,” there was evidence that suggested the U.S. government could have prevented 
the bombing.12  On August 7, 1998, the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were 
bombed.  One opinion on the U.S. embassy bombings is that, “Though, as any law 
enforcement official will remind you, intercepting 100 percent of all terror attempts is an 
impossibility, no one can seriously argue that the horrors of August 7, 1998, could not 
have been prevented.”13  On October 12, 2000, a small boat, filled with explosives, 
attacked the U.S. Navy destroyer Cole in Aden, Yemen.  Some have argued that if 
analyses and information from the U.S. Intelligence Community was given greater 
                                                 
8 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism – 2005: East Asia and Pacific Overview, 
April 2006, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64336.htm (accessed August 26, 2006). 
9 Miller, 38. 
10 Ibid., 55–56. 
11 Ibid., 90–91. 
12 Jon Dougherty, “Oklahoma City terrorism report released,” 
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=24056 (accessed Sep. 28, 2005). 
13 Miller, 195. 
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consideration or more quickly disseminated, the attack may have been prevented.14  Each 
of these events should have served as wake-up calls to the U.S. government. 
D. PRE-9/11 U.S. REACTIONS TO TERRORISM 
This is not to say that changes did not occur in the United States.  U.S. policy was 
affected.  Past administrations used a variety of methods to combat terrorism.  These 
included diplomacy, international cooperation, constructive engagement, economic 
sanctions, intelligence sharing, law enforcement cooperation, covert action, protective 
security measures and military force.15  Diplomatic and constructive engagement 
measures include the active role of the United States during the March 1996 Sharm al-
Sheikh peacemaker/anti-terrorism summit and efforts to have other countries join with 
the United States in imposing trade and economic sanctions.  International conventions 
were also used.  Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the United States was involved in developing 
all of the major anti-terrorism conventions including the Convention for the Marking of 
Plastic Explosives, U.N. Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, and the 
U.N. Anti-Terrorism Financing Convention.16  These conventions obligate signatories to 
prosecute or extradite offenders for hijacking vessels and aircraft, taking hostages, and 
harming diplomats among other terrorism-related crimes. 
In addition to these measures, specific economic sanctions were invoked.  
President Bill Clinton used executive orders to freeze terrorists’ and their associates’ 
assets.  On August 20, 1998, President Clinton froze assets owned by bin Laden, 
“specific associates, and their self proclaimed Islamic Army Organization, and 
prohibiting U.S. individuals associated with those organizations.”17  The Clinton 
administration had previously frozen assets of 18 individuals associated with Middle East 
terrorist organizations and 12 alleged Middle East terrorist organizations.  The 1996 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act prevents support to foreign terrorist 
                                                 
14 Raphael Perl and Ronald O’Rourke, The Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, 
Terrorist Act on USS Cole: Background and Issues for Congress, 2001, 1-4. 
15 Raphael Perl, The Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, Terrorism, the Future, and 
U.S. Foreign Policy, 2001, 3. 
16 Ibid., 12. 
17 Ibid., 8-9. 
8 
organizations listed by the U.S. State Department and denies their members entry visas 
into the United States.18 
The rewards for information program has been a successful U.S. State 
Department program used to combat terrorism.  This program is supplemented by the 
aviation industry and offers rewards to those who support efforts to combat international 
terrorism against U.S. citizens or U.S. property.  These efforts include information that 
prevents or resolves such terrorism or leads to the arrest or conviction of terrorists 
committing these acts.  The rewards for information program was partly responsible for 
the arrest of Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing.  Although established in 1984, it was supplemented in 1994 in a reaction to 
terrorist attacks with a “crime bill” that helps relocate reward recipients and their 
immediate family members.19 
Extradition efforts and rendition were also used in response to terrorist attacks.  
The U.S. State Department was proactive in limiting political offense exceptions found in 
most extradition treaties between the United States and other countries.  This exception 
has limited extradition for terrorist activities as terrorism involves politically motivated 
violence.  Rendition was also employed to bypass restrictions on extradition to gain 
physical custody over terrorist suspects.20 
Military force was another measure used.  President Clinton authorized the 
bombing of Iraq’s military intelligence headquarters by U.S. forces in 1993.  This was 
technically in response to Iraqi efforts to assassinate former President George H. W. 
Bush, but it was assessed that President Clinton also used this military force in response 
to Iraq’s participation in the first World Trade Center bombing.21  Another example of 
the use of military force was when U.S. cruise missiles pounded targets in Afghanistan 
                                                 
18 Charles Doyle, “Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: A Summary,” 
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/96-499.htm (accessed August 26, 2006). 
19 Perl, Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 10-11. 
20 Ibid., 11. 
21 Laurie Mylroie, “Iraq and Terrorism,” Iraq News, http://www.fas.org/news/iraq/1999/11/991124-
in2.htm (accessed August 26, 2006). 
9 
and Sudan during responses to the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Africa.  President 
Clinton stated, “there will be no sanctuary for terrorists.”22 
These measure focused U.S. policy on bin Laden and terrorist groups operating 
out of Afghanistan with the permission of the Taliban.  Focus also remained on the 
financing of terrorist groups through non-state sources.  These sources include charitable 
contributions, kidnapping and drug trafficking.23 
E. 9/11 TERRORISTS 
Since 1992, Usama Bin Ladin has been calling for attacks against the United 
States and the plans for these attacks have been extensively developed starting in the 
1990s.  In August 1996, Bin Ladin issued his personal declaration of Islamic war, a 
fatwa, on American soldiers stationed in Saudi Arabia.  This fatwa called on Muslims to 
drive out the U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, condemned the Saudi monarchy for defiling an 
area of the world with sites sacred to Islam by allowing the U.S. presence, and praised 
suicide attacks and bombings of targets that affected the United States.24  In February 
1998, Bin Ladin announced the formation of a World Islamic Front.  There was little new 
as far as rhetoric goes in the announcement, but it did focus more strongly on the United 
States and contained a fatwa that stated “to kill Americans and their allies – civilians and 
military – is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it 
is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa mosque and the Holy Mosque [in 
Mecca] and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and 
unable to threaten any Muslim.”25  In an interview three months later Bin Ladin 
elucidated his points by saying, “We believe that the worst thieves in the world today and 
the worst terrorists are the Americans.  Nothing could stop you except perhaps retaliation 
in kind.  We do not have to differentiate between military or civilian.  As far as we are 
concerned, they are all targets.”26  These ideas and the 1998 bombings of the Nairobi and 
                                                 
22 CNN, “U.S. missiles pound targets in Afghanistan, Sudan,” 
http://www.cnn.com/US/9808/20/us.strikes.01/ (accessed August 26, 2006). 
23 Perl, Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 5. 
24 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002), 47–48. 
25 Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co., Ltd., 
2004), 175–76. 
26 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 47–48. 
10 
Dar es Salaam U.S. embassies proved to be the turning point in the evolution of the 9/11 
plot.27 
In mid-1996, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed met with Bin Ladin in Afghanistan.  At 
this meeting, Bin Ladin was briefed on the first World Trade Center bombing, the Manila 
air plot, the cargo carriers plan, and other schemes that Mohammed and his affiliates had 
pursued while in the Philippines.  One of these other schemes was a proposal to train 
pilots to crash airlines into buildings inside of the United States.  As early as 1996, the 
9/11 plot had been hatched, but it was not pursued until 1998 when the U.S. embassy 
bombings were conducted by al Qaeda.  These attacks convinced Mohammed that Bin 
Ladin was committed to attacking the United States and permission for the 9/11 operation 
was given to Mohammed in late 1998 or early 1999 with the planning of the operation 
beginning at the same time.28   
By mid-1999, the first participants in the 9/11 operation had been selected.  Two 
of these, Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi were selected to attend pilot training in 
the United States in part because they had already obtained U.S. visas.  Others did not 
receive visas for a variety of reasons and supported the operation from several different 
countries.  These operatives attended special training in Afghanistan and Pakistan that 
focused on “physical fitness, firearms, close quarters combat, shooting from a 
motorcycle, and night operations” as well as American culture, basic English, flight 
simulator programs, and a variety of other necessary items.29  Mihdhar and Hazmi 
arrived in the United States at Los Angeles on January 15, 2000 as four more operatives 
were selected by al Qaeda for the operation. 
These four, Mohamed Atta, Ramzi Binalshibh, Marwan al Shehhi and Ziad 
Jarrah, had moved to Hamburg, Germany to study at Western universities and met each 
other through the university, part-time jobs or the al-Quds Mosque.  Mamoun Darkanzali, 
a Muslim businessman, also appeared to play a role in connecting the hijackers.  He was 
linked to al Qaeda through his connections to Bin Ladin’s key financial advisor, Mamdou 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
28 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 149. 
29 Ibid., 157. 
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Salim.30  Regardless of how they met, they became friends and their religious beliefs 
evolved into radical Islamic fundamentalism.  Depicting the United States as an invader 
into the Muslim world to undermine Islam marks this brand of radical Islamic 
fundamentalism.  If the United States is an invader, real Muslims, those who recognize 
the true threat, must undertake a raid, a ghazwah, against the superior foe.  This depiction 
mimics the small bands of early Muslims that defeated larger Meccan forces.  In this 
way, believers can hope to inflict serious damage on the “21st century Mecca of the 
West.”31  By late 1999, they decided to abandon their studies in Germany and join the 
jihad in Chechnya.  A chance meeting on a train in Germany led to the young men being 
recruited by al Qaeda and all four ended up in Afghanistan.  There they met with Bin 
Ladin, swore their loyalty to him and were assigned to the 9/11 operation.32  They were 
instructed to return to Germany and attend flight training school, but it quickly became 
apparent that the fastest and cheapest training was available in the United States.  All four 
applied for U.S. visas, but Binalshibh was unable to obtain his visa.  Shortly after the first 
two 9/11 operatives arrived in the United States, Atta, Shehhi and Jarrah also arrived.33 
The first two operatives to arrive in the United States, Mihdhar and Hazmi, were 
poorly chosen for the operation.  They had no experience in the West and spoke no 
English.  Although the local Islamic communities in Los Angeles and San Diego assisted 
Mihdhar and Hazmi, they were unable to overcome the language barrier and did not learn 
how to fly despite some flight schooling from an Arabic speaking instructor.  The 
instructor, Rick Garza, said, “It was clear to me they weren’t going to make it as pilots,” 
and that “It was like Dumb and Dumber.”34  He told them that they needed better English 
fluency and that he would not fly with them again until then.  By June, Mihdhar had 
returned to Yemen and by the fall of 2000, Hazmi was no longer studying English or 
attempting to learn how to fly.  Instead he patiently awaited the arrival of a new 
                                                 
30 John Miller, Michael Stone and Chris Mitchell, The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot, and Why the FBI and 
CIA Failed to Stop It (New York: Hyperion, 2002), 258–59. 
31 Juan Cole, “Al-Qaeda’s Doomsday Document and Psychological Manipulation,” 
http://www.juancole.com/essays/qaeda.htm (accessed August 25, 2006). 
32 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 160–66. 
33 Ibid., 168. 
34 Miller, 273. 
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companion, Hani Hanjour, who arrived in San Diego in December 2000.  A few days 
after his arrival, the two left San Diego.35 
In contrast with Mihdhar and Hazmi, the Hamburg contingent had better results.  
After arriving in the United States, Mohamed Atta pursued a $650,000 loan to purchase a 
twin-engine, six-passenger plane for crop dusting at a Farm Services Agency office in 
Homestead, Florida.  It appears that the September 11 plot may not have been completely 
decided upon until Atta was told that the U.S. Department of Agriculture did grant 
individual loans, but not for crop dusters.36  Despite this setback, the plot evolved and 
Jarrah arranged to attend the Florida Flight Training Center (FFTC) in Venice, Florida 
and after arriving in Newark, New Jersey on June 27, 2000, he moved to Florida and 
started training.  Atta and Shehhi had not decided upon a school and after checking out a 
school in Norman, Oklahoma, they decided upon Huffman Aviation in Venice, Florida 
and started training.  Jarrah obtained his single-engine private pilot certificate in early 
August, while Atta and Shehhi had soloed and passed the private pilot airman test by 
mid-August.37  The fourth and final pilot, Hanjour, attended flight training in Arizona 
after arriving in San Diego and meeting with Hazmi. 
Hani Hanjour fell into the laps of al Qaeda.  He studied English in the United 
States in 1991 and attended flight training in the United States intermittently from 1996 
through 1999 that culminated in obtaining a commercial pilot certificate.  Although his 
past involvement with al Qaeda is difficult to ascertain, he was in a training camp in 
Afghanistan in 2000 when either Bin Ladin or his deputy, Atef, realized that he was a 
trained pilot and familiar with the West.  He obtained his U.S. visa in September 2000 
and arrived in San Diego by December.  Although he was experienced, his previous 
instructors considered him a poor student and not committed enough to become a 
professional pilot.  Based upon this, his old flight school in Scottsdale, Arizona turned 
down his request to resume his pilot training.38  Despite this setback, by March 2001 he 
had completed his initial Boeing 737 training and was headed to Virginia with Hazmi.  
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The Hamburg contingent had received their commercial pilot licenses by mid-December 
2000 and started large jet simulator training.39  By May 2001, Hanjour and Hazmi were 
settled in New Jersey and the Hamburg contingent was in Florida awaiting the arrival of 
the muscle hijackers, the hijackers that stormed the cockpits of the airliners and 
controlled the passengers. 
Bin Ladin personally selected the muscle hijackers between the summer of 2000 
and spring of 2001.  Most of these operatives attended special training in Afghanistan 
camps and returned to their home countries to obtain U.S. visas.  After acquiring the 
visas, they returned for more training before departing for the United States.  The 
hijackers began arriving in the United States by late April 2001 and were met either by 
Atta and Shehhi in Florida or Hazmi and Hanjour in the American northeast.  Mihdhar 
was the last hijacker to come to the United States, arriving in New York on July 4, 
2001.40 
During the time the hijackers were preparing for the 9/11 attacks in the United 
States only two of the terrorists were known to establish ties within U.S. Islamic 
communities.  Khalid Sheikh Mohammed told all of the hijackers, except Hazmi and 
Mihdhar, to avoid establishing personal contacts and to stay away from mosques.41  Al 
Qaeda frequently encouraged operatives to act in ways contrary to Islamic beliefs to 
include hanging out at strip clubs and with fast women.  Mohammed was notorious for 
being a playboy during his time in the Philippines and several of the hijackers drank 
heavily and went to strip clubs.  This behavior served several purposes for al Qaeda.  
Antinomian behavior was a cover for the operatives, throwing off intelligence agents that 
might be tracking them.  It also was a way for the young men to live out their fantasies 
and feel they had lived a full life.  More than likely, al Qaeda encouraged this behavior to 
institute a measure of control over the hijackers.  As Muslim fundamentalists, their 
libertine behavior would ensure feelings of guilt and encourage the terrorists to give up 
their soiled existence and be born again after death.42 
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Mihdhar and Hazmi, due to their inexperience with the West, posed as Saudi 
students and likely received assistance from the Muslim community centered around 
King Fahd mosque in Culver City.  They met Omar al Bayoumi, a Saudi business 
student, while in Culver City and learned that San Diego might be easier to live in than 
Los Angeles.  Mohdar Abdullah, a Yemeni university student, likely drove them to San 
Diego when Hazmi and Mihdhar relocated.  Bayoumi assisted them in San Diego.  He 
found them an apartment, set up the lease and helped them open a bank account.  This 
apartment did not work out and another acquaintance, which Hazmi and Mihdhar met in 
a San Diego mosque, found them a room to rent in a house.  During their stay in San 
Diego, members of the Islamic Center of San Diego supported the two hijackers, as did 
Abdullah.  Abdullah introduced Hazmi and Mihdhar to his circle of friends that lived 
near the Rabat mosque in La Mesa.  An imam at the Rabat mosque, Anwar Aulaqi, 
developed a close relationship with the two hijackers and later may have supported them 
in Virginia.  While Hazmi and Mihdhar’s motivations are unknown, they were supported 
by ideologically like-minded Muslims and lived openly in San Diego without attracting 
excessive attention.43 
Until the 9/11 attacks, the terrorists kept busy by surveilling flights, traveling or 
training.  The pilots primarily accomplished the surveillance, but others did participate.  
A couple of the operatives flew to the Bahamas, but were denied entry and immediately 
returned to the United States.  This was most likely accomplished to renew their 
immigration status.44  The pilots received additional training and practiced flying, 
requesting to use the Hudson Corridor, a low-altitude route located along the Hudson 
River and close to the World Trade Center.  The hijackers opened gym memberships to 
stay in shape for the hijackings, but most were indifferent to conditioning with the 
exception of Atta.  The gym owner, Jim Woolard, said, “Atta was working out intensely, 
spastically…  He was crazy.”45  In the days prior to the attack, all operatives wire 
transferred unused funds to the United Arab Emirates and traveled to their final 
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deployment locations.46  On September 11th, they carried out their fateful attack on the 
United States.  Despite the difficulties inherent in preventing attacks of this type from 
occurring, there were opportunities that may have led to the prevention of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks. 
F. 9/11 MISSED OPPORTUNITIES 
The first opportunity was the interception of communications in late 1999 that 
members of an al Qaeda cell were planning to travel to Malaysia.  The CIA tracked both 
Hazmi and Mihdhar (initially selected as pilots for the 9/11 attacks) in January 2000, but 
lost them in Bangkok.47  Thai authorities were notified of the operatives’ presence in 
Thailand and reported in early March 2000 to the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center (CTC), 
created in the mid-1980s to circumspect the bureaucracy of the CIA and combat the 
transnational nature of terrorism, that Hazmi had traveled to the United States on a plane 
that departed January 15. Only the CTC was notified and this information was not shared 
outside of the center, which resulted in the two terrorists not being listed on the State 
Department’s TIPOFF watch list, a list of over 100,000 potential terrorists.48  
Additionally, this information was not shared with the FBI.49  Thai authorities did not 
report Mihdhar, despite being on the same flight.  Shortly after arriving in San Diego 
both operatives returned to Malaysia for an al Qaeda meeting to supposedly discuss the 
USS Cole bombings and 9/11 attack.  The CIA and FBI both knew about this meeting 
and the CIA even knew that Hazmi and Mihdhar were supposed to attend, although the 
CIA did not know who they were at the time.  Additionally, Mihdhar had obtained a U.S. 
multiple entry visa, which should have made him a candidate for surveillance if he had 
been put on the TIPOFF watch list.  However, the CIA failed to pursue any follow-ups 
after passing this information on to the FBI.50  Mihdhar was tied to another member of al 
Qaeda in January 2001 and again the CIA did not share this information with the State 
Department or the FBI.  This was critical considering that Mihdhar returned to Yemen in 
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June 2000 and applied for a new U.S. visa in June 2001, returning to the states on July 4, 
2001.51  This was not the only missed opportunity. 
Throughout 2001, leading up to the attacks, the U.S. intelligence community was 
receiving and passing on information of the increasing chances of a terrorist attack 
against the United States within the community and to organizations outside of it.  Even 
though this intelligence generally pointed towards an overseas attack, the possibility of an 
attack in the United States was discussed.  Despite these discussions, little was done 
domestically.52  The conclusions of the 9/11 Commission Report state, “In sum, the 
domestic agencies never mobilized in response to the threat.  They did not have direction, 
and did not have a plan to institute.  The borders were not hardened.  Transportation 
systems were not fortified.  Electronic surveillance was not targeted against a domestic 
threat.  State and local law enforcement were not marshaled to augment the FBI’s efforts.  
The public was not warned.”53  With the repeated terrorist attack warnings, CIA director 
George Tenet had investigators reexamine their files for clues about any upcoming 
attacks.  This resulted in the CIA checking with the INS about Mihdhar and Hazmi.  
After learning that they were both already in the United States, the CIA alerted the State 
Department, Customs, Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) and the FBI.  
Finally, they were placed on the watchlist and the FBI began the process of tracking them 
down.  However, the FBI claimed that by August 23, it was too late to locate the 
operatives.  This is despite the fact that both Mihdhar and Hazmi had bought tickets with 
credit cards and obtained identity cards in their own names just days after the FBI began 
its search.54  In addition to this reevaluation by the CIA, an analyst at the FBI involved in 
the USS Cole investigation became involved with information regarding Mihdhar.  Along 
with the CIA agents, she showed pictures containing Mihdhar to FBI agents working on 
the Cole case.  She determined that due to caveats, important National Security Agency 
(NSA) reports regarding the photos could not be shared with the FBI agents.  These 
photos would probably have tied Mihdhar to a suspected terrorist facility in the Middle 
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East.  This may have raised the interest in Mihdhar.  One of the CIA analysts at this 
meeting had all of the relevant facts, but failed to share any of the information resulting 
in no one looking for Mihdhar when he returned to the United States in 2001.55  More 
resources may have been put into the search for Mihdhar in New York once the FBI 
analyst put all of the pieces together, but a misinterpretation of the rules regarding 
information sharing prevented this from happening.56  Another missed opportunity 
involved Zacarias Moussaoui. 
Moussaoui appeared to have been selected as a pilot for a second wave of attacks 
by Bin Ladin and al Qaeda.  He had been training at a flight school in Norman, 
Oklahoma from February to May 2001, but quit the school at the end of May after flying 
over 50 hours and not progressing enough to fly solo.  Due to concern over whether or 
not Jarrah (one of the pilots in the 9/11 attack) would withdraw from the operation, the 
backup, Moussaoui, was wired $14,000 to start training again at the end of July.  By 
August 10, he began training in Boeing 747 simulators in Minnesota, but quickly raised 
suspicions due to his limited flying experience and conduct.  Although many hobbyists 
take this type of training without a pilot’s license, Moussaoui’s questions about things 
like communication with air traffic controllers caused the staff to worry.  After an 
instructor reported him to the authorities, the INS arrested Moussaoui in mid-August 
2001 on immigration charges.57  The Minneapolis FBI field office initiated an 
investigation immediately and quickly learned of Moussaoui’s jihadist beliefs.  The 
investigating agent came to the conclusion that Moussaoui was “an Islamic extremist 
preparing for some future act in furtherance of radical fundamentalist goals” and that 
some of his plan would involve the flight training he was attending.58  Due to legal 
difficulties, the FBI did not obtain a search warrant to search Moussaoui’s laptop 
computer despite foreign intelligence received from France linking him with a Chechen 
rebel leader.  The FBI also requested assistance from the U.S. legal attaché in London 
and the CIA sent a cable and requested information from France and Britain.  The FBO 
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sent a teletype to the CIA, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Customs 
Service, the State Department, the INS, and the Secret Service regarding Moussaoui, but 
did not include the investigating FBI agent’s conclusion that the terrorist may have been 
planning to use the flight training in an attack.59  The FAA did not receive a complete 
report due to sharing issues, but the case agent briefed the local FAA office on the gaps in 
the report.  However, the FAA did not take any special steps in response to this briefing.  
Although the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was briefed on Moussaoui, no 
connection to al Qaeda was mentioned and the matter was not pursued up the chain of 
command in the FBI.60  All of the information tying Moussaoui to al Qaeda and the 9/11 
plot was put together after September 11th.  British intelligence received on September 
13, 2001 put Moussaoui in an al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan and the FBI learned 
from another incarcerated terrorist that Moussaoui had been in the Afghan camps.  Either 
source of information could have resulted in a search warrant being issued and a full 
investigation being conducted.61  Yet another missed opportunity involved Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed. 
Although U.S. intelligence agencies knew that Mohammed was a terrorist, he was 
not tied to al Qaeda before 9/11.  However, there were several sources of information that 
could have led the CIA to this conclusion.  The first was a September 2000 report that 
Khalid al-Shaykh al-Ballushi was an important figure in al Qaeda.  The Bin Ladin unit in 
the CIA recognized that this name translates to “Khalid from Baluchistan,” Mohammed’s 
homeland and attempted to obtain more information without any results.  The CIA also 
began analyzing information about a “Mukhtar” that was associated with an al Qaeda 
lieutenant in April 2001.  On June 12, 2001, another piece of intelligence led to 
Mohammed being identified as Khaled, a terrorist that was recruiting people to travel 
outside of Afghanistan to conduct terrorist activities for al Qaeda.  It was also reported 
that colleagues were already in the United States waiting to meet these new recruits.  The 
CIA received the intelligence that Mohammed’s nickname was Mukhtar on August 28, 
but no connections were made.  If this information had been tied together, it would have 
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been possible to tie Mohammed to Binalshibh (the only member of the Hamburg 
contingent not to obtain a U.S. visa) and Binalshibh to Moussaoui.  This would have 
resulted in a more thorough investigation.62  These missed opportunities highlight some 
of the shortcomings and difficulties that existed in enforcing U.S. homeland security 
before the 9/11 attacks, but why did these problems exist in light of the terrorist activities 
in the United States and abroad against U.S. interests throughout the 1990s? 
G. COMPARISON OF PRE-9/11 AND 9/11 MISSED OPPORTUNITIES 
The primary problems that led to pre-9/11 terrorist activities were the lack of 
information sharing between U.S. government agencies due to communication failures 
and legal issues, and failure of leadership to provide an overarching guidance.  
Unfortunately, these same problems led to the 9/11 attacks. 
Many argue that the assassination of Rabbi Meir Kahane was the birth of Islamic 
fundamentalist terror in the United States.  Neil Herman, the JTTF supervisor, felt that 
the United States needed to heed this notice, but that did not happen.63  The NYPD and 
the District Attorney that tried the case wanted a quick conviction and refused to look at 
the broader picture.  47 boxes of military manuals and notes were taken from El Sayyid 
Nosair’s, Kahane’s assassin, residence, but this valuable evidence was not looked at until 
after the first bombing of the World Trade Center.64  The JTTF had two associates of 
Nosair in custody after Kahane’s assassination, but were told by the NYPD to let them 
go.  These two men ended up participating in the first World Trade Center bombing.65  
Already, information sharing was an issue and the lack of leadership resulted in divergent 
opinions. 
The first World Trade Center bombing reiterates these points.  The bombing again 
signaled the rise of the Islamic terrorist threat, but the success of the investigations, 
arrests and prosecution obscured the threat and contributed to the widespread 
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underestimation of the true threat.  The successful investigation and prosecution also 
created the impression that the U.S. law enforcement was efficient enough to deal with 
terrorism.66 
Prior to the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, problems 
with information sharing and guidance from U.S. leadership continued.  Until 1996, 
senior U.S. leadership, let alone most anyone in the U.S. government, did not understand 
the bin Laden was behind the new terrorist threat the United States was facing.  The lack 
of communication between U.S. agencies is partly to blame.  The CIA knew that bin 
Laden financed terrorists in Sudan in 1993 and the State Department noted bin Ladin’s 
involvement in aiding Yemeni terrorists in 1992.  The State Department tied some the 
first World Trade Center bombing participants to bin Ladin and put him on its TIPOFF 
watch list in 1993 after the State Department designated Sudan as a state sponsor of 
terrorism.  However, as late as 1997, CIA’s CTC still described bin Ladin as an 
“extremist financer.”67  In 1996, the CIA established the bin Ladin unit to analyze 
intelligence and plan operations against bin Ladin.  This unit learned about the 
availability of a bin Ladin and al Qaeda communications conduit prior to the 1998 U.S. 
embassy bombings, but another U.S. intelligence community agency refused to exploit it 
and threatened legal action against any CIA officer that attempted to.68  It did not help 
that the head of the bin Ladin unit, Michael Scheuer, had an abrasive style and did not 
work well with counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke or John O’Neill, the FBI’s expert 
on bin Ladin.  Due to these relationships, the bin Ladin unit rarely shared information 
with the FBI and led to an FBI agent stuffing files under his shirt to get them to 
O’Neill.69  Even the U.S. response to the U.S. embassy bombings, firing cruise missiles 
at targets in Afghanistan and Sudan, failed in part due to the lack of information sharing 
and leadership guidance.  CIA and U.S. military operations to detain or kill bin Ladin 
were all cancelled in part because of U.S. senior leadership guidance and interagency 
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lack of cooperation.  This led to cruise missiles being launched and bin Ladin escaping 
unharmed.70 
The final events that exemplify U.S. shortcomings covered in this thesis are the 
events that led to the attack on the USS Cole.  The arrest of Ali Mohamed, a participant 
in the U.S. embassy in Kenya bombing, almost did not happen due to the legal wall that 
contributed to the lack of information sharing.  Prosecutors did not have access to 
intelligence information until the suspect was arrested.  Obviously, this situation led to 
delays in arresting suspects or the suspects not being arrested at all.  Mohamed was 
released and not arrested until later that day.  He had planned on fleeing the country the 
next day.71  The CIA did not support Able Danger, a U.S. military intelligence operation 
that targeted Al Qaeda established in 1999, and information was not shared despite the 
fact that Able Danger was procuring useable intelligence.  Able Danger personnel also 
did not share information with the FBI due to legal concerns of U.S. military lawyers.72  
Additionally, Able Danger knew of increased al Qaeda activity in Aden, Yemen three 
weeks prior to the USS Cole attack and did not inform anyone outside of the U.S. 
military.73  After the attack on the USS Cole, the FBI had troubles with the U.S. 
ambassador in Yemen and eventually withdrew their investigators.74  It is amazing that 
the same problems with information sharing and leadership guidance were present in the 
missed opportunities for stopping the 9/11 plot. 
Many missed opportunities due to the lack of cooperation for information sharing 
occurred.  Khalid al Mihdhar was allowed to get a new U.S. visa in June 2001 after the 
CIA had tied him to another al Qaeda member, but did not share this information with the 
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State Department or the FBI.75  Throughout 2001, despite intelligence that chances of a 
terrorist attack against the United States were increasing, little was done domestically.76  
The FBI did not include critical information regarding Zacarias Moussaoui in teletypes to 
the CIA, FAA, Customs Service, State Department, INS, and Secret Service resulting in 
him not being tied to al Qaeda until after 9/11.77 
Missed opportunities due to legal issues for information sharing also occurred.  
Khalid al Mihdhar may have been detained in New York, but the CIA did not share NSA 
reports with the FBI due to legal caveats.  Zacarias Moussaoui’s laptop computer could 
not be searched due to legal difficulties in obtaining a search warrant.78 
The lack of U.S. senior leadership guidance also contributed to the 9/11 attacks 
not being prevented.  When the FBI received the intelligence that Mihdhar and Nawaf al 
Hazmi were in the United States, the FBI claimed that it was too late to locate the 
operatives despite it was only August 23, 2001.79  With more definitive counterterrorism 
guidance, the FBI may have conducted the search.  The 9/11 Commission Report stated 
that, “They (domestic agencies) did not have direction, and did not have a plan to 
institute.”80 
While these are just a few examples, the comparison between pre-9/11 and 9/11 missed 
opportunities shows that necessary changes in the U.S. homeland security establishment 
did not occur. 
H. FUTURE OF TERRORISM 
It is difficult to forecast with accuracy what the future of terrorism will involve, 
but based off of the attacks that the United States has faced in the past, it is possible to 
conjecture where fundamental Islamic terrorism is heading. 
Past attacks by al Qaeda have shown the ability of terrorists to utilize technology 
in new ways and take advantage of the open society of the United States.  The most 
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obvious example is the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  Al Qaeda utilized airplanes as bombs, 
trained their pilots in the United States and staged the important phases of the attacks 
from the United States.  Another example is the attack on the USS Cole.  The terrorists, 
instead of using a car bomb, used a boat bomb to take advantage of the vulnerability of 
the warship.  Additionally, the terrorists made their boat appear that they were one of the 
many helping with the USS Cole.  They even stood at attention while detonating their 
explosives. 
Al Qaeda has also utilized traditional methods of terrorism.  Although they 
utilized technology to bomb two U.S. embassies almost simultaneously, the terrorists still 
used the age-old method of bombing the buildings.  The same held true with the first 
bombing of the World Trade Center. 
Based on this information, it would appear that future attacks by al Qaeda will 
utilize both traditional means and new twists on these while maximizing new 
technologies and leveraging the open society of the United States.  Al Qaeda will most 
likely continue to attack where the U.S. defenses are weak and avoid operations that have 


























III. TERRORISM IN JAPAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To understand the Japanese and their efforts against terrorism, this thesis 
investigates two terrorist groups that originated in Japan: the Nihon Sekigun, Japanese 
Red Army (JRA), and Aum Shinrikyo, Aum Supreme Truth.  Prior to these case studies, 
Japan’s historical experiences with terrorism are briefly investigated. 
B. JAPAN’S PAST EXPERIENCES WITH TERRORISM 
In addition to the JRA and Aum Shinrikyo, Japan has a long history of terrorism.  
During the Showa Restoration that preceded World War II, Japan experienced a period of 
political instability and social upheaval that led to ultra-nationalists taking charge of the 
government.81  This period was highlighted by several terrorist attacks.  The period after 
World War II was also characterized by political instability and social upheaval and 
resulted in terrorist groups like JRA and the Chukaku-ha, Middle core faction.82  Japan in 
the 1990s was in recession after the booming economy of the 1980s, again causing social 
upheaval.  Religion helped the Japanese cope with their reversal of fortune, but many of 
these new religions were and are cults.  This spawned Aum Shinrikyo, a terrorist group 
based on religion.  Hopefully, none of Japan’s numerous other fringe religious groups 
choose the same path as Aum Shinrikyo. 
The Showa Restoration was marked by terrorist attacks.  The Ketsumeidan, Blood 
Oath Corps, carried out several of the attacks.  Inoue Nissho, the leader of this terrorist 
group of ultra-nationalists, masterminded two assassinations before his arrest.  His 
terrorist organization assassinated Japan’s prime minister after his arrest.  This resulted in 
the end of party-based politics in Japan and led to military control of the government 
prior to World War II.83 
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The period after World War II also spawned terrorist groups.  In addition to JRA, 
the Chukaku-ha also emerged during this period.  Initially a division within the Japanese 
Communist Party, the Chukaku-ha split from the party in 1957 and then divided into two 
groups in 1963, the Chukaku-ha and Kakumaru-ha, Revolutionary Marxist Faction.  The 
Chukaku-ha has conducted terrorist actions against the government of Japan, U.S. 
military and facilities within Japan, the United Nations (UN), and the G-7 Summit.84 
While not a comprehensive list, this brief review of terrorist groups from Japan’s 
past demonstrates Japan’s historical experiences with terrorism.  This thesis analyzes two 
primary and radically different terrorist groups that Japan has had to combat, the JRA and 
Aum Shinrikyo. 
C. JAPANESE RED ARMY 
The first case study covers the JRA.  This case study will assess its origin and 
history, and analyze specific terrorist acts committed by the JRA. 
The JRA originated from the social upheaval and turmoil in Japan following 
World War II.  The Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), General Douglas 
MacArthur, wanted to instill the seeds of democracy in Japan and in doing so, increased 
the opportunities for higher education at universities.  He also encouraged increased 
enrollment so as to challenge the old way of doing things in Japan with the new.85  While 
this may have helped the cause of democracy, it also increased the number of protests and 
debates as the young university students flexed their political muscle.  One of the first 
concessions the students won was autonomy to determine dormitory issues, food menus, 
and other mundane issues affecting university life.  Prior to receiving autonomy, students 
did not have the “freedom to make their own decisions on university matters.”86  After 
receiving autonomy, student associations began to grow in power.  The Zengakuren, the 
All-Japanese Federation of Student Self-Governing Associations, was a successful 
attempt by the Japanese Communist Party to gather all of the separate student 
associations into one group.  Towards the end of 1948, the Zengakuren consisted of 
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almost 60% of Japan’s student population.87  The Sekigun-ha, Red Army Faction, 
developed out of the Zengakuren and the United Tokyo-Yokohama Struggle Council 
Against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, two of the most radical elements of the student 
movement of the late sixties.88  The Red Army Faction’s first training session on 
November 3, 1969 resulted in a police raid that netted 53 participants at Daibosatsu 
Pass.89  From this point, the Red Army Faction developed into the Japanese Red Army. 
The JRA developed into three different factions and the activities of each merit 
attention.  The first faction was headed by Takamaro Tamiya, who joined a splinter group 
from the Red Army Faction that later became the Japanese Red Army.90  This faction was 
responsible for the JRA’s first terrorist act, the hijacking of a Japanese domestic flight.  
On 31 March 1970, nine members of the JRA, armed with samurai swords, hijacked 
Japan Airlines Flight 351 from Tokyo to Fukuoka, known as the Yodo-go, and forced it to 
land in North Korea.  The JRA took the 122 passengers and seven crew members as 
hostages.91  Because the plane did not have enough gas to fly directly to North Korea, the 
plane landed in South Korea and the passengers were allowed to disembark in exchange 
for a Japanese deputy transport minister who offered himself as a hostage.92  After 
landing in North Korea, the nine members of the JRA were welcomed by Kim Il Sung 
and described by him as “golden eggs.”93  The terrorists were not seen again until 1972 
when they appeared wearing suits with Kim Il Sung’s badge on their lapel.  The terrorists 
claimed that they had changed their philosophy to that of North Korea’s Juche 
ideology.94  In response to their re-appearance, the Japanese government stated that the 
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hijackers “had confessed their errors and had become good workers.”95  This was Japan’s 
method of saying that this faction of the JRA had been “taken care of.”  However, 
members from this group of terrorists would go on to carry out terrorist activities for the 
next eighteen years throughout the world.  During these years, the Japanese police would 
claim that the terrorists lived as guests of North Korea.96 
The second faction of the JRA stayed in Tokyo and was led by Tsuneo Mori and 
Hiroko Nagata.  They met increasing police pressure and suffered many failures during 
their domestic operations leading to a sense of dissatisfaction and the need to reorganize.  
This second faction of the JRA was disgruntled to the “point where it had lost all sense of 
reality.  They were so frustrated that they turned violence in on themselves.”97  This 
violence occurred at Haruna, a mountainous region in central Japan, where the JRA fled 
the 1972  Tokyo police crackdowns.98  Mori and Nagata urged the members to “purify 
their revolutionary thoughts and to create unity”, but the process of “criticism, self-
criticism and group criticism” quickly escalated and resulted in the torture and death of 
fourteen Red Army members.99  The police eventually tracked down the location of the 
group and after a nine-day siege, stormed the facility and with two police fatalities, took 
five prisoners.  The storming of the facility was televised live.  Mori later committed 
suicide and Nagata was sentenced to death.100  The fourteen dead members were later 
discovered and sixteen JRA members were imprisoned, shocking Japan’s public.101  This 
incident effectively ended the Japanese Red Army’s presence in Japan. 
Fusako Shigenobu led the final faction and was convinced that the revolution the 
JRA wanted could not be started in Japan.  Therefore, they went to Lebanon and joined 
forces with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).102  While abroad 
this group committed many terrorist acts, such as attacking the Lod Airport in 1972, 
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holding the Japanese Embassy staff in Kuwait hostage in 1974, taking fifty hostages from 
the American Consulate and Swedish Embassy in Malaysia in 1975, and the 1977 
hijacking of a plane.  While not all inclusive of this faction’s endeavors, these acts are 
significant either in scope or in the reaction of the Japanese government. 
This faction of the Red Army first attacked the Lod Airport in Israel.  On May 30, 
1972, three Asian men in the baggage claim area of Lod Airport picked up their bags and 
pretended to be going through them.  They then opened fire on the crowed baggage claim 
area with submachine guns and grenades.  They also threw grenades at planes and 
attacked a waiting room.  Friendly fire killed one terrorist, while another was killed by 
his own grenade.  The third was captured trying to throw a grenade at a plane.  The attack 
resulted in 24 dead and 80 wounded.103   Although the captured terrorist, Kozo Okamoto, 
received an Israeli life sentence, he was released in a 1985 prisoner exchange between 
Israel and Palestinian militant factions.104  The Japanese government protested 
Okamoto’s transfer to Libya as a condition of the exchange, but could not change the 
outcome.  He was arrested again in Lebanon for forgery and Lebanese authorities granted 
him asylum when he was released in 1999.  Although Okamoto was granted asylum, four 
other JRA members released at the same time were deported to Jordan and sent to Japan 
where they were arrested.105 
JRA committed another act of terrorism in 1974.  Two members of the JRA, 
supported by two members of the PFLP, attempted to destroy a Shell Oil Company 
refinery in Singapore on Jan 31 that only resulted in one oil storage tank being set on fire.  
During their escape, the terrorists captured a ferryboat and took eight hostages.  Five of 
the eight hostages were released during negotiations with Singaporean officials for the 
exchange of the remaining hostages for safe transport to an Arab country.106  On 
February 6, during the on-going negotiations, other JRA members stormed the Japanese 
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Embassy in Kuwait and held about twelve members of the embassy staff, including the 
ambassador, Ryoko Ishikawa, hostage to apply pressure to the Japanese government.  
Japan capitulated to the terrorist demands by providing a Japan Airlines plane that 
transported the terrorists in Singapore to Kuwait and then all of the terrorists to Aden, 
Southern Yemen, on 8 February.  Southern Yemen authorities released the terrorists on 
10 February.  In addition to the plane, Japan also paid a ransom for the release of the 
hostages in Kuwait.107 
Following the same basic plan, the JRA struck again in August 1975 by taking 
about fifty hostages from the American Consulate and the Swedish Embassy in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia, to include the U.S. consul and Swedish charge d’affaires.  The 
demands of the terrorists included the release of seven JRA members imprisoned in Japan 
and a Japanese airplane to fly them to their destination of choice.  Japan met the terrorist 
demands, but only five of the imprisoned JRA members chose to leave jail.  These 
released prisoners were put on board a Japan Airlines flight to Kuala Lumpur with a crew 
of nine.  Once the plane landed in Malaysia, the hostages were exchanged for two 
Japanese government officials and two Malaysian government officials who traveled with 
the terrorists to Tripoli, Libya.  These officials were released after arriving in Libya.108  
Malaysian officials were frustrated by Japan’s slow response to the situation.  They felt 
that the delay in getting a Japan Airlines plane to Malaysia was a ploy and that the 
Japanese negotiator, the Japanese minister of transport, was disagreeable.  Malaysian 
officials also felt that the Japanese ambassador to Malaysia was “clumsy”.109  During the 
negotiations, a Malaysian commando team was in place with snipers, but they were not 
allowed to act.110 
The final act of terrorism committed by the JRA covered in this case study 
occurred in 1977.  Five members of the JRA hijacked Japan Airlines Flight 472 en-route 
from Paris to Haneda Airport, Tokyo, Japan.  After a stopover in Mumbai, India, the 
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terrorists took over the flight and forced it to land in Dacca, Bangladesh.  With the 156 
passengers and crew as hostages, the JRA demanded the release of nine JRA prisoners in 
Japan and a $6 million ransom.111  The then Japanese Prime Minister, Takeo Fukuda, 
responded that Japan would meet the JRA demands because “human life is more 
important than the world.”112  A Japan Airlines flight was chartered and loaded with the 
ransom money and six of the nine released JRA prisoners.  After arriving in Dhaka, 118 
passengers and crewmembers were exchanged by the hijackers.  The remaining hostages 
were flown to Damascus via Kuwait City where eleven more were released.  The plane 
was then flown to Algeria where the authorities impounded it and the last hostages were 
freed.113 
D. AUM SHINRIKYO 
Aum Shinrikyo provided Japan with a different challenge compared to JRA.  The 
following case study covers the history of Aum Shinrikyo and the terrorist acts they 
committed. 
Chizuo Matsumoto founded Aum Shinrikyo in 1987.  Matsumoto was the leader 
of this religious cult and grew up in poverty.  Because he was blind in one eye and only 
had partial vision remaining in his good eye, he was sent to a special school for the 
visually impaired.  While in school, Matsumoto took advantage of other, more seriously 
disabled students by making them do favors for him and charging them money for 
helping the students with various tasks.114  However, he was also remembered for his 
ability to reach out to unpopular children.  He ran for student council president in 
elementary, middle and high school, but always lost.  The children thought that although 
he would “show concern for people sometimes,” Matsumoto was also scary.115  At the 
school for the blind, he studied acupuncture and herbal medicine, and when he graduated 
in 1977, he moved to Tokyo in an attempt to enter a university.  Although he wanted to 
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graduate from the university and enter into Japan’s elite, Matsumoto was unable to pass 
the entrance exams and moved back to his hometown.116  He later moved back to Tokyo, 
opened a store that specialized in acupuncture and herbal medicines, and married.  His 
1982 arrest for selling fake medicine gave rise to his and his wife’s dislike of the police 
and the media.117  While in Tokyo, Matsumoto began to develop an interest in religions 
and joined Agonshu, a relatively new religion established in 1978.  Agonshu is based on 
the belief that acts of sad spirits of the dead cause the everyday problems of the living 
and emphasizes liberation from stress through meditation.118  In 1984, he and his wife 
started giving yoga lessons and attracted a following.  In 1986, during a trip to India, 
Matsumoto claimed to receive enlightenment in the Himalayan Mountains and upon his 
return to Japan in 1987, changed his name to Shoko Asahara and founded Aum 
Shinrikyo.119  Aum is Sanskrit for the “powers of destruction and creation in the 
universe,” and Shinrikyo is the “teaching of the supreme truth.”120  The goal of Asahara’s 
religion was to teach the truth about the creation and the destruction of the universe.121 
Aum Shinrikyo’s troubles began in 1989.  In Japan, the Religious Corporations 
Law is used to determine which groups will receive the special benefits of being 
recognized as a religion.  These benefits include tax breaks, protection from government 
interference and the right to own property as a group.  There are three requirements that a 
group must meet to qualify for this status: having at least a three-year history, owning 
their own facilities, and freedom of members to join or leave of their own accord.122  
When Aum Shinrikyo applied to be recognized, they initially were denied based on 
complaints filed by families of group members.  These complaints were filed because 
members had to give up all ties and sever communication with their families upon 
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entering the cult.  Aum Shinrikyo protested the denial by filing lawsuits, protesting and 
demonstrating.  Later that year, the government of Japan approved and recognized Aum 
Shinrikyo as a religion.123 
In addition to problems with the Religious Corporations Law, Aum Shinrikyo also 
had problems with Sakamato Tsutsumi, a lawyer.  The Sunday Mainichi, a popular 
Japanese newspaper, ran a series about Aum Shinrikyo called “The Insanity of Aum 
Shinrikyo.”124  Aum Shinrikyo responded by harassing the editor, Taro Maki, until the 
journalist suffered a severe stroke.125  This article generated a large response and ended 
up with Sakamoto helping out families concerned with the treatment of their kin involved 
with Aum Shinrikyo.  Aum Shinrikyo responded by threatening to sue the paper, but 
Sakamoto continued his investigation into the group.  He later discovered that a claim of 
Asahara was false.  Asahara had claimed that he had his blood tested and that his DNA 
was special in a different way from other human beings.  In a meeting with Aum 
Shinrikyo’s lawyer, Yoshinobu Aoyama, Sakamoto brought up this claim and was told 
that a graduate of the medical school had conducted the research at an Aum Shinrikyo 
facility, but no evidence of this was provided.  The meeting quickly degenerated into a 
shouting match and left Sakamoto with an “uneasy” feeling.126  Two days later, six 
members of Aum Shinrikyo crept into Sakamoto’s house and murdered Sakamoto, and 
his wife and baby.  For the next three days, Aum Shinrikyo members drove across Japan 
and buried the bodies in various mountain locations.  Asahara justified these killings to 
his members and had the Japanese penal code for murder read to all involved members.  
They were all in this together and would suffer the penalty of death if any of them 
betrayed the group.127 
In 1990, Asahara began to believe that political action was necessary to save the 
world and created the Shinri-to, Party of Truth, political party.  Under this party, twenty-
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five members of the cult ran for election and all lost.  This attempt to broaden their 
message to the world was expected to succeed and proved to be a large blow to Aum 
Shinrikyo.  In addition to spending around $7 million on the elections, members being 
reintroduced to society, fled the cult in large numbers.128  Another result of the lost 
elections was the increase in Aum Shinrikyo-bashing as Japanese began to ridicule the 
cult.129  This started a disastrous sequence of events where the group’s goals moved from 
teaching about the truth of the universe’s creation and destruction to preparation for the 
coming apocalypse.  These preparations included building nuclear shelters and 
commencing a biological and chemical weapons program.130 
Aum Shinrikyo first established a biolab with the intent of producing botulinus.131  
From this starting point, a militarization of the group began.  They built a larger lab and 
began the process of producing sarin, a Nazi nerve gas, and anthrax.  Aum Shinrikyo 
members received military training and produced or procured conventional weapons.132  
In June 1994, the group’s first sarin gas attack took place.  This attack killed seven people 
and wounded over 200 in a Matsumoto residential area.133  This attack injured three 
judges that lived in the area and were set to hear a case against Aum Shinrikyo.  
Unfortunately, a local gardener was accused of the attack diverting attention from Aum 
Shinrikyo.134  In July 1994, several members of Aum Shinrikyo were seen running from 
a building on their compound in gas masks, but it was not until January of the next year 
that Aum Shinrikyo was linked with the gas attacks in Matsumoto.  In March, the police 
stormed Aum Shinrikyo’s headquarters in Osaka and arrested three members on charges 
of abduction.  The cult responded by gassing the subway station below the police 
headquarters in Tokyo with sarin gas.  This attack on 20 March 1995 resulted in twelve 
dead and thousands incapacitated.135 
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Following the March subway attack, 2,500 Japanese police began investigating 
and searching twenty-five Aum Shinrikyo facilities in Shizuoka and Yamanaki 
prefectures.  The justification for these actions was not the subway attacks, but the 
disappearance of a Tokyo notary public, Kariya Kiyoshi, in February 1995 that was tied 
to an Aum Shinrikyo official.  Shortly after the investigations began, Aum Shinrikyo 
attempted the assassination of the head of the National Policy Agency (NPA), Director 
Kunimatsu Takaji.   Although he was seriously wounded, he was not killed.136 
Following the subway attacks and assassination attempt, Aum Shinrikyo 
followers were arrested by the NPA.  Despite the arrests, Aum Shinrikyo remained 
active.  In April 1995, a series of attacks hit the Yokohama railway system.  On 11 April, 
twenty people complained of sore throats and foul odors.  On 19 April, 500 people were 
hospitalized due to mysterious fumes.  On 21 April, fumes in a store near a Yokohama 
rail system station overcame twenty-seven people.137  In May, Aum Shinrikyo-related 
events continued to occur. 
On 5 May, 1995, two bags of poison gas were found in a restroom in the Tokyo 
Shinjuku subway station. After two months of searching, Shoko Asahara was finally 
found on May 16, 1995 hiding in a secret room in Aum Shinrikyo’s main facility at 
Kamikuishiki village with large amounts of cash and gold bars.  Several comatose 
followers were also found at the facility.  Asahara was arrested, tried, and sentenced to 
death.  Japan’s supreme court denied his final appeal in September 2006 and he will 
remain on death row until put to death.138  Aum Shinrikyo still operates in Japan, but has 
changed its name to Aleph and removed doctrines that justified using murder.139 
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IV. COMPARISON OF U.S. AND JAPANESE RESPONSES TO 
TERRORISM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The 9/11 attacks on the United States generated responses, just as the Japanese 
Red Army, Aum Shinrikyo and the Global War on Terrorism did in Japan.  In addition to 
the JRA, Aum Shinrikyo and the GWOT, Japan’s responses to other terrorist threats are 
briefly assessed.  U.S. responses involve law enforcement, intelligence, diplomacy, 
finances and the military.  Japan responded by relying on domestic policing, giving in to 
terrorist demands, and also passing new laws to combat terrorism.  This comparison 
highlights the differences and similarities in their responses.  
B. U.S. RESPONSES TO 9/11 ATTACKS 
The immediate responses to the 9/11 attacks indicated the need for change in the 
U.S. system.  The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had to improvise during the complex events that 
played out on the morning of September 11th.  They did not follow established protocols 
and struggled to ensure the integrity of the U.S. homeland defense against a threat they 
had not trained to meet.140  The emergency response to the attacks was also improvised.  
The first responders and all others involved with the rescue were not sufficiently trained 
nor prepared for this type of event.141  It must be emphasized that the U.S. system (law 
enforcement, legal, intelligence, and others) for dealing with terrorism had changed in 
response to the pre-9/11 terrorist threats and that some of these changes resulted in 
success, in one form or another.  However, it obviously did not change enough to prevent 
the same errors from occurring in the events leading up to 9/11.  So, what changed after 
9/11? 
There have been many changes to the U.S. system since the 9/11 attacks.  
Changes related to law enforcement have been significant.  In 2002, the Department of 
Homeland Security was established and President George W. Bush issued a strategy for 
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homeland security.142  This department now has the responsibility for many of the areas 
that were problematic prior to 9/11 including: “protecting borders, securing transportation 
and other parts of our critical infrastructure, organizing emergency assistance, and 
working with the private sector to assess vulnerabilities.”143  The Patriot Act was 
instituted immediately after 9/11.  This law has allowed the security and intelligence 
agencies of the United States to act with greater freedom.144  Another law that was 
passed in the aftermath of 9/11 was the Aviation and Transportation Security Act.  The 
Homeland Security Act and the Maritime Transportation Security Act followed this in 
2002.  The first law created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which 
became a part of the Homeland Security Department, while the other two laws “required 
the development of strategic plans to describe how the new department and TSA would 
provide security for critical parts of the U.S. transportation sector.”145  Border security 
and procedures have also changed.  The first phase of a screening program that uses 
biometrics, United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology program 
(USVISIT), has been implemented along with an integrated watchlist that “makes 
terrorist name information available to border and law enforcement authorities.”146 
Changes have also occurred in the U.S. intelligence community.  In August 2004, 
President Bush enacted four Executive Orders that changed and refortified the U.S. 
intelligence community without legislation.  In December 2004, President Bush signed 
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which created a Director 
of National Intelligence (DNI).  John D. Negroponte was sworn in on April 21, 2005 as 
DNI and the Office of the DNI (ODNI) began operations the next day.147  In addition to 
bureaucratic change, there are several times as many analysts that look at all types of 
intelligence that focus on terrorism as there existed prior to 9/11.  Human intelligence 
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collection has also been increased on targets of primary concern.  Additionally, sharing of 
intelligence with other countries has been increase.  To ensure that those who need this 
intelligence see it, stovepipes that existed have slowly been eliminated.  The National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has been strengthened and now integrates twenty-eight 
intelligence networks.  Access to its data has been increased from the hundreds to the 
thousands.  The newly created National Counterproliferation Center was co-located with 
the NCTC to increase information sharing.  The National Security Branch was created at 
the FBI to expand and connect their intelligence, counterterrorism and 
counterintelligence capabilities.  State and regional fusion centers are being linked with 
Joint Terrorism Task Forces to create a national network to increase communications and 
information exchange.  The FBI has also created a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
Division to ensure that counterterrorism efforts include WMD expertise.148 
U.S. responses to 9/11 also include diplomatic efforts.  One major part of this 
effort is from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).  “USAID 
promotes peace and stability by fostering economic growth, protecting human health, 
providing emergency humanitarian assistance, and enhancing democracy in developing 
countries.”149  Since 9/11, USAID has been carrying out this mission in support of the 
GWOT.  Another effort has been the Millennium Challenge Account that was created to 
reward countries that champion the U.S. values of governing justly, investing in their 
people, and allowing free markets.150  The account was established in January 2004 and 
the U.S. Congress provided nearly $1B in FY04 and $1.5B in FY05.151  A third response 
has been the Partnership for Progress and a Common Future.  The G-8 launched this 
program in 2004 to support political, economic and social reform in the Middle East and 
North Africa.  This program consists of a Forum for the Future, Democracy Assistance 
Dialogue, literacy and education initiative, and entrepreneurship centers.152  In addition 
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to these high-visibility programs, the U.S. government also provides countless training 
and assistance programs for foreign government officials and militaries.  This includes 
the U.S. State Department’s anti-terrorism assistance training and U.S. Department of 
Defense anti-terrorism conferences.153  The United States has responded to 9/11 through 
efforts to combat the spread of WMD.  Major initiatives include the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI), Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, and the Global Threat Reduction 
Program.154 
Since 9/11, the United States has attempted to disrupt the financing of terrorists.  
President Bush issued Executive Order 13224 that blocked over 400 individuals and 
entities from their assets and isolated them from the U.S. financial system.  The Secretary 
of State has designated forty-two groups as foreign terrorist organizations.  This action 
blocks travel of group members to the United States, freezes their assets held in U.S. 
financial institutions and makes providing them material support illegal.  The Office of 
Hostage Affairs in the U.S. embassy in Baghdad has helped hostages being freed or 
rescued through interagency and international efforts.  Kidnapping has been a key source 
of terrorist financing and these efforts are helping.  The United States also continues to 
work with other nations to reach agreements to disrupt terrorist finance networks within 
the international system.155 
Of course, the highest profile and most debated responses to 9/11 have involved 
the U.S. military and combat operations.  The first operation was and is Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan.  The plan for OEF had four phases.  Phase one 
involved the movement of troops into the region and coordination with other countries to 
operate from or over their territory.  This occurred in the weeks following 9/11 and 
involved countries such as Pakistan and Uzbekistan.  Phase two required air strikes and 
special operation attacks on al Qaeda and Taliban targets.  The attacks began on October 
7, 2001 with the basing arrangements from Phase one being completed by the end of the 
month.  Phase three included decisive operations to topple the Taliban regime.  By early-
December 2001 all major cities were held by coalition forces.  OEF is still in phase four, 
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which involves security and stability operations.156  The other major military operation 
has been Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  While debatable if OIF was in response to 
9/11, OIF is now the centerpiece of the GWOT.  Operations began in March 2003 and 
major military operations ended in April 14, 2003.157  Three stages have been defined to 
achieve victory in Iraq, short-term, medium-term and longer-term.  The short-term stage 
is defined as, “Iraq is making steady progress in fighting terrorists, meeting political 
milestones, building democratic institutions, and standing up security forces.”158  
Medium-term means “Iraq is in the lead defeating terrorists and providing its own 
security, with a fully constitutional government in place, and on its way to achieving its 
economic potential.”159  Currently, OIF is between the short-term and medium-term 
stages.  In addition to OEF and OIF, U.S. forces have been deployed to Africa, the 
Philippines and Columbia since 2001 as part of the GWOT.  The U.S. military is likely 
involved in activities in other countries or regions in support of GWOT, but these 
activities are too numerous and minor to name here.160 
While these are not all of the responses by the United States to the 9/11 attacks, 
they do represent the major activities of the United States.  The United States has pledged 
to fight al Qaeda and global terrorism with each instrument of national power to include 
law enforcement, intelligence, diplomacy, finances and the military.  Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the number of activities in support of the GWOT are too numerous to list. 
C. JAPANESE RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 
1. Japanese Red Army 
Japan’s security policy relied primarily on domestic policing and capitulating to 
terrorist demands to protect the lives of hostages.  The National Police Agency and the 
Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), which has responsibility for the entire Tokyo 
metropolitan area, have been key in accomplishing domestic policing.  These two 
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organizations were successful in driving the JRA out of Japan.  Informal surveillance was 
one of the ways that they accomplished this feat.  Because Japan’s centralized system of 
police administration is embedded in society, the police can depend on the active 
cooperation of local businessmen and old people to police themselves.161  A major 
instrument of informal surveillance and cooperation between society and the police is the 
koban (police box).  These small police stations are located throughout the country and 
provide a low-key presence of the police in Japan.  The koban provides many services to 
the community including providing directions, personal counsel and mediation.  
Additionally, the police that work in the koban account for only 40% of the total amount 
of police, but clear 70% of the crimes.162  The koban work as informal listening posts, 
while providing these services to society.  The police perform house calls (with 
cooperation from business and other associations, these visits are expected and not 
considered a bad thing) and keep track of all kinds of information on the people living 
and visiting in their effective areas.  This data “could be utilized for other specialized 
police activities” which would include combating terrorism.163  The police used informal 
surveillance to discover a planned meeting of the Red Army faction and arrested 53 
members of the Red Army Faction at Daibosatsu Pass. 
In addition to informal surveillance, active surveillance by the police played a 
large role in driving the JRA out of Japan.  Before the JRA began committing terrorist 
activities and was holding public meetings to gain members, plain-clothes police 
photographed everyone attending the meeting and also stood in the back of the hall 
during the meeting.  To avoid being identified, the leaders of the JRA had to wear ski 
masks.  The police put JRA members under constant surveillance after the JRA began 
their attacks and in some cases a member was assigned two to three plain-clothes 
policemen.164  These actions were partly responsible for tracking down the JRA at 
Haruna and driving them out of Japan. 
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Other elements of domestic policing are non-violence and patience.  These 
elements have helped increase cooperation with the police by making their image 
friendlier to the populace.  When the police raided Haruna after the nine-day siege to 
capture the remaining JRA members, they lost two, but did not create any martyrs.  The 
police operated under the rule “Thou shalt not kill” and it was very effective.  Patience 
has paid off, but it is debatable if that is due to just luck.  From the 1980s until present, 
many members of the JRA have been arrested and tried for their crimes.  At the time of 
JRA’s terrorist acts, Japan could do little internationally and their patience has helped put 
many of the remaining members of the JRA behind bars.  These actions resulted in the 
Japanese Red Army being removed from the State Department’s list of active terrorist 
groups in 2001.165 
Although it is considered criminal justice and not domestic policing, Japan’s 
national prison system has also been effective in combating the JRA.  While this may 
seem insignificant, Japan’s system has resulted in many criminals breaking and 
cooperating with the police, leading to further arrests.  Japan’s police are allowed to hold 
a suspect in a police prison for up to twenty-three days in conditions that were reported as 
shocking by Amnesty International in 1984.166  Because most radical prisoners are held 
in isolation and access to others, including their lawyers, is restricted, detaining political 
prisoners on lesser offenses has been very successful.  It is interesting to note that in the 
Haruna raid, only five members of the JRA were arrested, but it led to an additional 
eleven members being arrested. 
While the above examples demonstrate some of the successes that Japan’s police 
force had, their policy of capitulating to terrorist demands were not successful.  In each of 
the cases where the Japanese government was involved internationally with the JRA, 
Japan gave in to terrorist demands.  This resulted in a weak image and put Japan in the 
pocket of the JRA.167  In 1978, Japan publicly stated that they would no longer acquiesce 
to terrorist demands, but this policy was not tested until 1999.  In 1999, four Japanese 
                                                 
165 Andrea Koppel and Elise Labbot, CNN, “State Department list terrorist groups,” War Against 
Terror, http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/10/05/inv.terrorist.list/ (accessed December 6, 2005). 
166 Katzenstein, “Cultural Norms,” 83. 
167 Sean Curtin, “Japan exorcises the ghosts of terrorism past,” Asia Times Online, Apr. 20, 2004, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FD20Dh03.html (accessed December 6, 2005). 
44 
geologists were taken hostage in Kyrgyzstan and it is rumored that the Japanese 
government paid their ransom, either directly or through a corporation.168  This did not 
bode well for Japan’s policy on terrorism, but Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi helped 
reverse this national policy the next time it was tested after 1999 in a 2004 standoff with 
kidnappers of Japanese citizens in Iraq.  Prime Minister Koizumi did not concede to the 
terrorists and all five Japanese hostages were released.169  Although this was not a true 
test of Japan’s policy because none of the hostages were executed, it is a sign that Japan’s 
policy is changing from capitulating to terrorist demands to not negotiating with 
terrorists. 
2. Aum Shinrikyo 
While the JRA provided Japan with an international left-wing target, Aum 
Shinrikyo posed many domestic problems for the Japanese.  The Japanese police are 
often criticized for not identifying the violent potential of the Aum Shinrikyo group, 
particularly given their acquisition of a considerable arms cache.  The Religious 
Corporations Law greatly hamstrung police efforts against Aum Shinrikyo members.  
Once Aum Shinrikyo received their approval as an official religion, the police backed off.  
Even when the police had information that linked Aum Shinrikyo to various events they 
failed to use it due to religious freedom and separation of church and state.170  This taboo 
was obviously very difficult for the NPA and MPD to overcome.  In 1996, the Justice 
Ministry’s Public Security Investigation Agency (PSIA) attempted to invoke the Anti-
Subversive Activities Law to disband Aum Shinrikyo.  This use of the law resulted in 
protests by many human rights and religious groups and in 1997 the request was denied.  
It was not until 1999 that the Japanese government finally passed a law to deal with a 
terrorist organization like Aum Shinrikyo.  This law allows state security officials to 
“enter and search the facilities of groups that have committed indiscriminate mass murder 
over the past ten years.”171  PSIA invoked this law and Aum Shinrikyo was officially 
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targeted.  Another problem that plagued Japanese law enforcement was the fact that the 
system depended heavily on confessions forced by questionable interrogation techniques 
and not the painstaking detective work or forensic science techniques used by Western 
law enforcement agencies.172  Without using wiretaps and undercover work, the police 
did not stand a chance against a highly organized and tight-knit group like Aum 
Shinrikyo.  Even when the police finally raided Aum Shinrikyo’s facilities on the charge 
of land fraud, it was handled like most Japanese police raids.  It was highly staged, with 
tons of cops and media.  Additionally, it was announced in advance and therefore did not 
turn up anything of value.173  Another problem with the Japanese system is the lack of a 
national investigative authority.  This forced local police forces to investigate Aum 
Shinrikyo activities, but usually these investigations took a backseat to each locality’s 
more important issues.  Rivalries between local police forces and the Tokyo police also 
resulted in information not being shared.  The Japanese Security Bureau, an intelligence 
agency, noted Aum Shinrikyo’s international activities, but also did not share 
information.174 
Even though the police had problems dealing directly with Aum Shinrikyo, they 
still performed many of their functions well.  After the subway attacks, the people of 
Japan wanted to be reassured that they were being protected.  Under the social norms that 
exist in Japan, citizens were willing to see certain constitutional rights ignored.175  In 
response to the subway attacks, the Self Defense Force (SDF) was mobilized for the first 
time since 1960 for an internal security threat and the police deployed up to 60,000 
personnel in the streets.  Additionally, the police obtained search warrants, arrested Aum 
Shinrikyo members on minor charges, and used isolation and interrogation methods to 
obtain more information.176  These methods were applied with the typical patience 
exemplified by the NPA and MPD. 
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3. Responses to Other Terrorist Threats 
While Japan was dealing with the JRA and Aum Shinrikyo, other nations were 
dealing with terrorist threats.  Japan was aware of other nation’s battles with terrorism 
and since terrorism existed within Japan, Japan should have assessed other terrorist 
threats, but they did not. 
In the case of the JRA, Japan was satisfied with its efforts to drive them abroad 
and were “uninterested in and misjudged the significance of the fact that Japanese 
terrorists were operating abroad.”177  Because Japan was unaware of the link between the 
PFLP and the JRA, the government of Japan was caught by surprise by the JRA and 
PFLP attack on the U.S. and Swedish embassies in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 1975.  
This alone should have forced Japan to assess other terrorist threats, but by the 1980s, 
JRA’s international operations and importance were in decline, and did not force Japan to 
assess other threats.  The Oslo Agreement and changes in Syrian policy in the 1990s 
forced the JRA out of the Middle East and with the arrests of most of their cadre, the JRA 
ceased to be a threat.178  Therefore, Japan did not have to assess other terrorist threats up 
to the time Aum Shinrikyo became a threat. 
When Aum Shinrikyo was recognized as a religious group under the Religious 
Corporations Law in 1989, they were allowed to operate without interference from 
Japan’s police forces due to a long standing taboo that insists on the strict separation of 
church and state in Japan.179  Therefore, while the police forces of Japan were aware of 
left-wing radicals, like the members of the JRA, they did not examine the activities of 
religious sects even if there was the appearance of criminal conduct.  Prior to the sarin 
gas attack by Aum Shinrikyo in 1995, Japan did not conceive of religious sects as serious 
threats to state security.180  Unfortunately, Aum Shinrikyo did not change Japan’s 
perspective.  Following the attacks, Japan focused on ensuring that Aum Shinrikyo would 
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not be a threat to Japan again.  The law that was passed only applies to groups that have 
committed indiscriminate mass murders over a ten-year span.181 
Throughout the 1990s, the G-8 and other nations were unequivocally advancing 
antiterrorism policies, but Japan did not declare terrorism as a threat to national 
security.182  This has to do with Japan’s perspective on terrorism.  Japanese usually are 
referring to foreign terrorists operating outside of Japan and do not consider international 
terrorism a threat.  Additionally, Japan does not have many of the different types of 
global terrorist groups that other countries face (eco-terrorists, ethnic hate groups, anti-
abortion organizations, or animal right organizations) operating within Japan.183  This 
viewpoint and the focus on Aum Shinrikyo prevented Japan from assessing other terrorist 
threats prior to 9/11 and the GWOT. 
4. Global War on Terrorism 
The 9/11 attacks resulted in considerable changes with Japan.  Japanese responses 
included economic support to the United States and Iraq, participation of the Self Defense 
Forces (SDF) in the Global War on Terrorism, and new laws that enabled Japan to 
actively fight the GWOT. 
After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center towers, Prime Minister 
Koizumi pledged his country’s support to the United States.  In his speech, he used tough 
language to describe the attacks in which twenty-four Japanese lost their lives calling 
them “unforgivable.”184  On September 19, 2001, Prime Minister Koizumi outlined 
Japan’s initial response to the terrorist attacks.  Japan’s basic policy considered the 
terrorist attacks a threat to their national security and that they would actively engage in 
the fight against terrorism.  Additionally, Japan would support the United States and 
other countries in the Global War on Terror.  This basic policy also included specific 
measures that the Government of Japan would implement.  These seven-point immediate 
measures included:  
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1. “The Government of Japan (GOJ) will promptly take measures necessary 
for dispatching the Self-Defense Force (SDF) for providing support, 
including medical services, transportation and supply, to the US forces and 
others taking measures related to the terrorist attacks, which have been 
recognized as a threat to international peace and security in the United 
Nations Security Council resolutions 1368.” 
2. “GOJ will promptly take measures necessary for further strengthening 
protection of facilities and areas of the US forces and important facilities 
in Japan.” 
3. “GOJ will swiftly dispatch SDF vessels to gather information.” 
4. “GOJ will strengthen international co-operation, including information 
sharing, in areas such as immigration control.” 
5. “GOJ will extend humanitarian, economic and other necessary assistance 
to surrounding and affected countries. As a part of this assistance, GOJ 
will extend emergency economic assistance to Pakistan and India, which 
are co-operating with the United States in this emergency situation.” 
6. “GOJ will provide assistance to the displaced persons as necessary. This 
will include the possibility of humanitarian assistance by SDF.” 
7. “GOJ, in co-operation with other countries, will take appropriate measures 
in response to the changing situation to avoid confusion in the 
international and domestic economic systems.”185 
In addition to the seven point emergency measures, Prime Minister Koizumi also pledged 
$10 million in economic support to the United States for rescue assistance.186  To enable 
the seven point emergency measures, a new law was passed called the Anti-Terrorism 
Special Measures Law.  Passed on 29 October, this law allows Japan to support the 
international fight against terrorism on its own initiative.187  The passage of the Anti-
Terrorism Special Measures Law was a show of great support for the United States.188  
However, this law is not permanent and will expire in two years, but does include a 
clause to extend it for an additional two years.  The law initially would have expired in 
                                                 
185 Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, Japan's measures in response to the simultaneous 
terrorist attacks in the United States, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2001/0919terosoti_e.html (accessed December 6, 2005). 
186 Great Britain House of Commons, Library, 11 September 2001: The Response, Research Paper 
01/72, 2001, 29. 
187 Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the 
Passing of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Bill, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2001/1029danwa_e.html (accessed December 6, 2005). 
188 Larry M. Wortzel, The Heritage Foundation, “Joining Forces Against Terrorism: Japan's New Law 
Commits More Than Words to U.S. Effort,” Research: National Security, 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/BG1500.cfm (accessed December 6, 2005). 
49 
2003, but was extended to 2005 and again to 2006.189  On November 9, 2001, SDF Aegis 
cruisers left Japan for the Indian Ocean and provided rear area logistical support for the 
coalition forces operating in Afghanistan.190  The GOJ also provided refugee assistance 
to Afghan refugees in Pakistan through the SDF, international institutions, and Japanese 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  They also approved emergency measures to 
provide additional support to Pakistan and Tajikistan, while economic measures were 
taken to freeze terrorist funds.  The GOJ also undertook diplomatic efforts to promote 
cooperation on the GWOT.191  These efforts were only the beginning. 
The GOJ established the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction 
Assistance in Iraq law to provide support to the war in Iraq.  This law was passed on July 
26, 2003, and provides a structure to allow Japan to provide assistance to Iraq.192  
Specifically, it allowed the SDF to deploy to Iraq and provide support to the Iraqi people.  
Activities conducted included “medical services, water supply, rehabilitation and 
maintenance of schools and other public facilities and transportation of materials such as 
those for humanitarian and reconstruction use and others.”193  Additionally, SDF aircraft 
transported materials between Kuwait, Iraq and the Indian Ocean, including the Persian 
Gulf.194  The SDF and its materials departed Japan for Kuwait on the 20th and 21st of 
February 2004.  They trained in Kuwait and then deployed to Samawah, Iraq where they 
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carried out their missions.195  The GOJ also provided economic support to the United 
States.  In addition to a $1.5 billion grant to provide for immediate reconstruction needs 
in Iraq, the GOJ provided up to $3.5 billion in concessional loans to the United States to 
meet medium-term reconstruction needs.196  Beyond the economic support provided to 
the United States, Japan also provided economic support to Iraq through international 
organizations.197 
The GOJ was constrained by their constitution to combating international 
terrorism through economic aid and cooperation.  The GWOT has allowed Japan to have 
a direct hand in combating terrorism abroad through the use of their defense forces.  
While the SDF is not allowed to participate in any offensive operations, they deployed 
and provided support.  Additionally, the GOJ has passed new laws to allow this 
participation.  This is also a difference from the previous two case studies.  While much 
has changed, some things have not.  Although Prime Minister Koizumi quickly stated 
that Japan would provide support to the United States, the GOJ proceeded with their 
usual patience prior to passing the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law and the Special 
Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq.  The hostage incident 
in Iraq in 2004 was also a valuable event for the GOJ in substantiating their international 
policy on terrorism and kidnapping.  This incident occurred when Muslim militants took 
three Japanese volunteer workers hostage and threatened to kill the Japanese unless 
Japan’s troops were pulled from Iraq.  Prime Minister Koizumi refused to withdraw the 
Japanese self-defense forces and the hostages were released.198 
In summary, Japan began to take action on terrorist threats after 9/11.  They 
instituted some laws that resulted in antiterrorism measures, cooperated with other 
nations to improve the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and participated in terrorism 
                                                 
195 Jijigaho, “Self Defense Forces to assist in Reconstruction,” 
http://www.jijigaho.or.jp/app/0404/eng/iraq01.html (accessed December 6, 2005). 
196 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, Japan's Assistance for the Reconstruction of Iraq 
(Assistance to meet the medium-term reconstruction needs of Iraq), 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/tyokan/2003/1024press_e.html (accessed December 6, 2005). 
197 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, Japan’s Assistance for the Reconstruction of Iraq, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/tyokan/2003/1015press_e.html (accessed December. 6, 2005). 
198 CNN, “Three Japanese Hostages Released,” 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/04/15/iraq.hostages.japan/ (accessed August 8, 2006). 
51 
conferences.199  Unfortunately, the new antiterrorism laws address only overseas and 
regional situations and leave Japan unprepared for domestic attacks.  Japan has instituted 
other laws that deal with direct attacks, but direct attack is defined ambiguously in 
deference to Japan’s peace constitution.  The laws are not meant to change Japan, but 
instead to chip away at the politically sensitive issue of constitutional amendment.  
Additionally, measures were adopted to increase security procedures, but seem 
inadequate.  For example, the NPA armed their personnel with 1,000 automatic rifles and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) created a special ten-man unit within the Policy 
Coordination Division headed by a ambassador in charge of terrorism.200  Therefore, by 
U.S. standards, Japan’s counterterrorism policy is more of a stance.  It lacks the basic 
points that make up a policy, a definition of terrorism, threat assessments and the 
designation of foreign terrorist organizations.  The NPA and PSIA have defined 
terrorism, but neither has the responsibility to punish terrorists.  Threat assessments are 
critical to determining policy priorities and designating foreign terrorist organizations 
helps prevent transnational terrorists from crossing borders.  Japan needs to address these 
shortcomings to move from a half-hearted policy to a full-fledged counterterrorism 
policy.201 
D. COMPARISONS OF RESPONSES 
The United States has responded to the attacks of 9/11 by using every instrument 
of national power against al Qaeda and in support of the GWOT.  This comparison will 
utilize these instruments of national power to evaluate the U.S. and Japanese responses to 
the terrorist events covered in this thesis. 
A comparison of law enforcement responses shows many similarities.  In 
response to 9/11, the United States passed laws to establish the DHS and increase 
counterterrorism capabilities, while Japan also passed laws to increase counterterrorism 
capabilities and added a special unit on counterterrorism to an existing division within 
MoFA.  The major difference is the scope of efforts.  The U.S. establishment of the DHS 
is a major bureaucratic effort to reorganize the government of the United States, while 
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Japan did not attempt to change their government’s structure.  Japan’s change has been 
minor and not surprisingly, ineffective, while the verdict is still out on the effectiveness 
of the DHS.  Japan’s other efforts in law enforcement after 9/11 have been mostly 
symbolic, such as arming the police with 1,000 automatic rifles.  This is surprising 
considering the success Japan experienced in using law enforcement to drive the JRA 
from Japan in the early-1970s.  Japan’s law enforcement system was not effective against 
Aum Shinrikyo, but they did pass laws after the 1995 subway attacks to deal with the 
group. 
Intelligence reform comparisons reflect major differences.  The United States has 
reorganized the U.S. intelligence community and has made many changes in how 
intelligence is gathered and used.  9/11 and the lack of information sharing that 
contributed to the attacks not being stopped, is slowly being addressed.  Japan 
successfully used intelligence against the JRA while they were a domestic threat, but 
since then they have struggled to have an effective intelligence community.  Japan is still 
facing this challenge today. 
In contrast with intelligence efforts, U.S. and Japanese efforts to use diplomacy 
against terrorism have been similar.  Both countries put weight behind the theory that 
supplying aid to a country will improve the conditions for its citizens and therefore, will 
decrease the chances that terrorist will be created and spread.  Japan has dealt with the 
international JRA and the al Qaeda threat in roughly the same manner by spending 
money to make the problem go away.  The major difference between the United States 
and Japan has been Japan’s reliance on capitulating to terrorist demands.  While Prime 
Minister Koizumi was successful in dealing with terrorists in Iraq, it remains to be seen 
how Japan will react to terrorists in the future. 
Preventing terrorist financing has been a priority for the United States and Japan 
since 9/11.  This is in contrast with Japan’s earlier experiences with terrorism where 
Japan tended to be oblivious of the international terrorist threats.  Only when reminded of 
their dealings with Aum Shinrikyo during the 9/11 attacks did Japan act.  It is difficult to 
determine if this was due to the U.S.-Japan security alliance or if Japan really perceived 
an external terrorist threat to their sovereignty. 
53 
The United States and Japan have both responded with their uniformed services, 
but their responses are inherently different.  Japan has been restrained by their 
constitution and the government’s interpretation of it.  The Self-Defense Forces of Japan 
were never used to respond to the JRA and they were only used after the Aum Shinrikyo 
subway attacks to essentially provide peace of mind.  Only with new laws and a broad 
interpretation of Japan’s constitution were the Self-Defense Forces able to participate in 
rear-echelon support of coalition forces in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan 
and provide reconstruction forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq.  In contrast, the 
United States has arguably used the military as its primary response against terrorism 
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V. JAPANESE HOMELAND SECURITY PARADIGM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Japan has had successes and failures in dealing with terrorism.  Some responses 
that Japan has used successfully in combating terrorism include the use of public 
diplomacy to undermine public support of terrorism, patience and the integration of law 
enforcement into society.  Patience has also worked against Japanese efforts versus 
terrorism.  Japan’s inconsistent application of terrorism policies has also been negative.  
These successes and failures define the Japanese homeland security paradigm.  After 
elucidating the Japanese homeland security paradigm, Japan’s perception of their 
homeland security paradigm is analyzed as well as how the paradigm applies to other 
terrorist threats in Asia. 
B. SUCCESSFUL JAPANESE RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 
The GOJ has effectively used public diplomacy to combat terrorism.  While 
battling the JRA, the Japanese government used media to portray the Red Army as 
enemies to society.  This image was internalized by the Japanese people and ensured 
public support of domestic policing efforts, resulting in the JRA moving abroad.  In the 
Aum Shinrikyo case, it became a national pastime to ridicule Aum Shinrikyo.  Due to its 
status as a religious organization, this did not have the effect desired.  With the GWOT, 
the GOJ made the United States’ campaign appear defensive in nature and secured a 
majority approval from its citizens for its actions.202  Patience was also used successfully. 
Patience is a part of the Japanese national character.  The Japanese seldom rush 
into decisions and approach a problem from all angles before taking action.  In their 
battle against terrorism, it has helped and hurt them.  By being patient and allowing the 
international situation to change, the GOJ has arrested most of the JRA members.  This 
has effectively destroyed this organization.  With the GWOT, the Japanese Diet took its 
time deliberating over the wording of both new laws that were passed to allow Japan’s 
participation.  While not satisfying all members of their government, the carefully 
justified participation in the Global War on Terrorism is largely supported by the 
population. 
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The final successful response covered here is the integration of law enforcement 
into society.  While the Japanese police agencies have trampled civil liberties, they have 
integrated themselves into society to the point where these injustices are not even 
considered a nuisance by the society as a whole.  Imagine the response of a neighborhood 
in the United States where the police went door to door asking personal questions.  
However, this convenience store approach to law enforcement, where citizens come to a 
police box and order what they need, pays huge dividends with information collection.  
Additionally, surveillance has played a large role in the police’s success.  Tie this to 
favorable interpretations of law enabling the police to hold suspects in unfavorable 
conditions for a period of time and it results in obtaining good information.  These 
methods are effective in undercutting a terrorist network’s safe havens. 
C. UNSUCCESSFUL JAPANESE RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 
On the negative side, inconsistency in terrorism policies has hurt Japan.  To date, 
Japan lacks a coherent policy for combating terrorism.  All actions have been reactionary.  
In the case of Aum Shinrikyo, Japan had to pass a special law just to get surveillance 
approved on the group after the subway attacks.  Unless Japan enacts further reforms, a 
religious group meeting Japan’s national definition of a religion could easily perpetrate a 
terrorist act similar to Aum Shinrikyo.  On the international front, not having a true 
policy can hurt.  Giving in to terrorists and then saying you will no longer give in, only to 
cave again, does not help a country’s reputation.  The Iraq hostage situation was not a 
very good test of Japan’s policy. 
While patience has been a successful response for Japan, it has also had negative 
repercussions.  The Aum Shinrikyo case best exemplifies this.  Japan still has not 
changed anything regarding the Religious Corporations Law.  While waiting out both the 
JRA and Aum Shinrikyo, each terrorist group carried out attacks within Japan.  Even 
while their citizens were begging for action, the police and government moved with 
typical slowness.  Flexibility to deal with different situations will be required for success. 
D. JAPAN AND THE JAPANESE HOMELAND SECURITY PARADIGM 
It is apparent that Japan responded to terrorist events as described in the previous 
chapters.  Some of these responses have been successful and others have been 
unsuccessful, but is this a paradigm?  As Peter J. Katzenstein points out, Japan’s history 
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of dealing with terrorism follows four basic principles.  These include focusing on non-
military policy instruments, an inherent domestic focus, unique domestic policing and an 
exception to policy based on religion.203  Japan’s responses to the JRA, Aum Shinrikyo 
and 9/11 follow this paradigm. 
Japan’s constitution and national character, which favors pacifism since World 
War II, have forced Japan to focus on a broader set of policy instruments than just 
focusing on military instruments, to include economic aid and international cooperation.  
Japan’s economic aid increased to Syria to restrict the movement of JRA terrorists in that 
country when Japan’s royal family went abroad in the 1970s.204  Japan resumed 
economic aid to Pakistan for its efforts to combat terrorism after 9/11.205  Japan 
cooperated with Russia and shared information on Aum Shinrikyo in the aftermath of the 
1995 subway attacks.206  In addition to economic aid and international cooperation, Japan 
was also able to rely on patience.  Japan waited for the international environment to 
change before being able to deal with JRA internationally.  Japan’s cooperation with 
Russia to combat Aum Shinrikyo would not have been possible due to the international 
system in 1980s and Japan would have never been able to respond to 9/11 as they did 
without the 1995 subway attacks. 
While Japan has used policy instruments in the international environment, their 
efforts to combat terrorism have typically been domestically focused.  Japan thought little 
about the JRA once they were driven abroad.207  Japan offered little to no cooperation 
with Russia before the 1995 subway attacks as it attempted to deal with Aum Shinrikyo.  
Even though Japan has provided support to the U.S. GWOT, a large percentage of 
Japan’s population has trouble understanding what terrorist threat al Qaeda or radical 
Islamic terrorism poses to its sovereignty. 
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Japan has been marked by the uniqueness of its domestic policing.  Surveillance 
and information collection that would probably be considered illegal in other countries 
proved extremely successful in driving the JRA abroad.  Japan’s domestic policing may 
be part of the reason that al Qaeda has been unable to strike an attack in Japan. 
While Japan’s domestic policing has been successful against the JRA and 
possibly radical Islamic terrorism, it failed against Aum Shinrikyo.  A line marks Japan’s 
paradigm that Japanese police do not like to cross when dealing with religious groups.  
Not only was Japan completely surprised by the emergence and destructiveness of Aum 
Shinrikyo, they were completely unable to react.208  Eventually, one law was changed to 
deal with Aum Shinrikyo’s situation.  A law that will probably not work against future 
religious groups that turn violent. 
E. THE JAPANESE HOMELAND SECURITY PARADIGM AND OTHER 
THREATS 
In the past, Japan had to deal with indigenous terrorist groups like JRA and Aum 
Shinrikyo.  However, Japan’s economic involvement in Southeast Asia and participation 
in GWOT has opened Japan to a new set of terrorist threats.  Japan’s homeland security 
paradigm will be challenged in dealing with these new threats. 
Japan received its first threat from al Qaeda in October 2003.  This came in the 
form of a videotape on which Bin Ladin threatened the United States and its allies, 
including Japan, with suicide attacks.  In November 2003, al Qaeda directly threatened 
Japan with terrorist attacks if it sent troops to Iraq and Abu Mohamed al-Ablaj, a known 
al Qaeda operative, sent an e-mail to Al-Majallah, an Arab language weekly, claiming 
that Tokyo would be easy to destroy.209 
In addition to the new threats from al Qaeda, the terrorist threat from Southeast 
Asia is growing.  The GWOT is increasing in this region as the United States and the 
Philippines cooperate on counter-terror operations in that country and terrorist attacks 
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continue to occur within the region.210  Additionally, in Spring 2005, intelligence sources 
tracked an al Qaeda operative from Pakistan to Southeast Asia where he was rumored to 
be setting up a terrorist cell to attack Japan.211  This threat was emphasized by an attack 
on a Toyota auto showroom in Indonesia in December 2002.  Jemaah Islamiah terrorists 
have also threatened Japan.212  Japan’s investment in the region and the large amount of 
Japanese nationals that live in the Philippines and Indonesia, make Japan an inviting 
target for Jemaah Islamiah and other Southeast Asian terrorists.213 
So, how will the Japanese homeland security paradigm work against these new 
threats?  To answer this question, the basic principles of the paradigm need to be applied 
against the threat. 
Non-military policy instruments will be very important for Japan.  Japan has good 
relationships with the nations of Southeast Asia and has provided close to 12 trillion yen 
in economic assistance to the region since 1954.214  In addition to providing economic 
assistance, Japan is also providing counterterrorism assistance.  One initiative is through 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).  In 2004, through the APEC Counter-
Terrorism Capacity Building Initiative, Japan provided seven airports in Southeast Asia 
and three seaports in Indonesia with security equipment, hosted a Port Security Seminar 
for Southeast Asian countries, and held the Head of Asian Coast Guard Agencies 
Meeting in Tokyo.215  Through these measures, Japan is seeking to defuse factors that 
contribute to terrorism. 
Japan must battle its inherent domestic focus and the exceptions it grants to 
religious organizations.  Japan’s politicians need to continue with efforts that make the 
Japanese public aware of the threats against Japan.  Only through understanding, will the 
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public support Japan’s efforts in the GWOT.  With the threat specifically from radical 
Islamic terrorists, Japan should evaluate its laws and capabilities versus threats from 
religious groups operating in Japan.  These two basic principles are limiting factors in the 
Japanese homeland security paradigm working against these new threats. 
The final principle of the Japanese homeland security paradigm is Japan’s unique 
domestic policing.  Japan has a Muslim community that consists of around 80,000 
immigrants from Indonesia, Pakistan, India, Iran and Turkey.  While Japan is restricted in 
targeting religious organizations, they have no problems using racial profiling in an 
extremely homogenous population.  It is suspected that Japan is using its unique domestic 
policing model to keep a close eye on its Muslim community.216 
Although Japan needs to convince its population of the international terrorist 
threat to Japan and have to deal with an ingrained taboo with investigating religious 
organizations, their domestic policing policies and international cooperation bode well in 
combating al Qaeda and other Southeast Asian terrorists. 
  
                                                 
216 Olimpio. 
61 
VI. U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY AND THE JAPANESE 
PARADIGM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. responses to the 9/11 attacks covered in Chapter IV have deficiencies.  
These include problems within the Department of Homeland Security, the lack of a 
forward-looking strategic plan, border security and procedures not based on a layered 
defense, and deficiencies in identifying terrorists and attacking their finances.  Because 
these are only some of the deficiencies in the U.S. response, the United States should 
look to other countries to learn from their successes and failures.  Japan has had to 
respond to terrorists, including the Japanese Red Army and Aum Shinrikyo, and their 
homeland security paradigm should be investigated to gain insight into what successes 
the United States could integrate and which failures they should not integrate into their 
homeland security system. 
B. DEFICIENCIES IN THE U.S. RESPONSES TO THE 9/11 ATTACKS 
With regards to the newly established Department of Homeland Security, there 
are many areas where deficiencies still exist.  The establishment of the department alone 
will not make the United States safer and there remain concerns about the effectiveness 
of an extremely large and complex department.217  In addition to the department’s 
mandate to unify government efforts, it must also work with the private sector to ensure 
preparedness.  However, the private sector remains unprepared for a terrorist attack.  
What is needed is a National Preparedness Standard that includes evacuation plans, a 
communication capability, and a plan that addresses continuity.  The compatibility and 
adequacy of communications between “public safety organizations, chief administrative 
officers, state emergency management agencies, and the Department of Homeland 
Security” remains a problem.218  Additionally, other gaps in U.S. homeland security, 
such as the “development of port security plans, and improving security of transportation 
networks aside from airports,” need to be addressed.219  The Patriot Act, while important, 
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still needs to be informally debated by the nation’s institutions and the fine line between 
civil liberties and security must be established.  Cooperation, generosity and community 
can provide a foundation in the face of the terrorist threat.220   
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act created the TSA, which became a 
department in the DHS after its creation.  The TSA is responsible for transportation 
security in the United States.  It has deployed a significant workforce of baggage and 
passenger screeners (currently more than 43,000), as well as federal air marshals.  With 
this workforce, the TSA has been screening 100 percent of checked luggage for 
explosives.221  The TSA has coordinated with local mass transit agencies to assess 
vulnerabilities while increasing emergency preparedness training and conducting 
emergency drills.  U.S. port security has also been addressed with the Coast Guard using 
new security guidelines to perform risk assessments at U.S. ports.  The Customs Service 
and the Immigration and Naturalization Service have also been active in strengthening 
U.S. port security.222  The Homeland Security Act created the DHS, which combined 
more than twenty existing federal agencies including the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Coast 
Guard and INS.223   
The Maritime Transportation Security Act created a security program for all U.S. 
ports by requiring vulnerability assessments and security plans for vessels and port 
facilities that could include screening procedures, security patrols, identification 
procedures, access control measures, surveillance equipment and establishing restricted 
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areas.224  All three of these acts mandate the development of strategic plans to ensure the 
security of critical areas of the U.S. transportation sector by the DHS and TSA, but 
current efforts demonstrate the lack of a forward-looking strategic plan.225  Additionally, 
a layered security system needs to be implemented.  A layered security system has 
multiple levels that each protect and reduce the risk of a terrorist attack.   
Using 9/11 as an example, some of the terrorists traveled to the United States on 
expired visas, used phony identification, were allowed to board planes and then take over 
the planes.  A layered security system would have checks and preventative measures at 
each level to prevent a terrorist attack from occurring.226  While weaknesses with the 
U.S. border security and immigration system have been reduced, problem areas still exist.  
The merging of border agencies into one new department means that some lessons 
learned about terrorist travel have not been instituted into U.S. border security.  A focus 
on travel documents at every phase of the U.S. border security and immigration system 
needs to be established with the appropriate technology to accomplish the task.  While 
the new biometric screening system is a step in the right direction, the only people 
covered by the system are visitors who obtain U.S. visas to travel to the United States.227  
The effort to stop the financing of terrorist activities has evolved since 9/11, but more 
efforts are required on the diplomatic front to identify and name individuals and groups 
as terrorists.  A focus needs to be placed on what methods future terrorists will use to 
meet their financing needs.228  As with the list of changes, the list of critiques can also go 
on and on, but it is readily apparent that despite the post-9/11 changes, more work is 
required. 
C. THE JAPANESE HOMELAND SECURITY PARADIGM APPLIED 
In the 2003 U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the United States 
developed a “4D” strategy to “defeat terrorists and their organizations” and “defend U.S. 
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citizens and interests at home and abroad.”  This consists of the following tenets:  “deny 
sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists” and “diminish the underlying conditions 
that terrorists seek to exploit.”229  The Japanese homeland security paradigm will be 
applied to this “4D” strategy as Japan’s experiences parallel U.S. experiences. 
There are parallels between Japanese experiences with terrorism and the United 
States’ experiences.  Of course, the major parallel is that both the United States and Japan 
are involved in the GWOT.  Japan has deployed troops even if they are restricted by 
Japan’s pacifist constitution.  Both countries are also using non-military policy 
instruments to combat terrorism.  With the JRA, Japan faced both a domestic and 
international foe in a long, drawn battle, much like the United States is facing in its battle 
against al Qaeda and the GWOT.  Japan’s experiences with Aum Shinrikyo also have 
parallels with the U.S. experience.  Aum Shinrikyo came out of nowhere, had religious 
connotations, and struck a terrible blow with their sarin gas attacks on Tokyo’s subway 
system.  These parallels allow the application of the Japanese homeland security 
paradigm to the U.S. “4D” strategy. 
Following the U.S. “4D” strategy, to “defeat terrorists and their organizations” the 
United States must use non-military policy instruments to “deny sponsorship, support and 
sanctuary to terrorists” and “diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to 
exploit” in addition to the military instrument of national power.230  Japan has used 
economic aid, international cooperation, media impressions and patience.  Many would 
argue that since Japan has had to depend on these methods, they have used them better 
than the United States.  Based upon this assertion, it may even be plausible that the 
United States has modeled its economic aid programs off of Japan.  USAID and the 
Millennium Challenge Account both have goals similar to Japan’s Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) and Country Assistance Programs.   
International cooperation is another element of Japan’s non-military policy 
instruments.  Due to constitutional restrictions, Japan has had to use international 
cooperation to combat terrorism.  The main lesson that the United States can learn from 
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Japan in this capacity is that an isolationist view will not work and that you have to work 
with other countries to be successful in combating terrorism.  While the United States is 
still working on its use of international diplomacy, its international cooperation programs 
exceed those of Japan.  What Japan has done better is relying on other countries to make 
changes that benefit Japan’s policies. 
Another aspect of Japan’s non-military policy instruments is the use of media for 
public diplomacy.  Japan has been able to control aspects of their media to portray 
government views to the public.  This has resulted in intense public pressure on extremist 
groups.  The United States, due to its own unique past, may never be able to control the 
media to the extent that Japan has been able to do.  However, more cooperation to get 
across government views may be possible. 
Using only non-military policy instruments has also forced Japan to depend on 
patience for the international environment to change before being able to act.  This is a 
lesson that could be very valuable to the United States as it realizes that it cannot go the 
distance all by itself. 
Domestic policing will also be important to “diminish the underlying conditions 
that terrorist seek to exploit.”231  Japan has integrated their policing into society.  This is 
something the United States may never be able to do as well as Japan.  One step in this 
direction is the U.S. use of the Patriot Act.  While many argue that the Patriot Act 
oversteps constitutional bounds by restricting U.S. citizens’ rights, it also has made the 
job of domestic policing easier through the easing of tight restrictions on U.S. law 
enforcement agencies.  Even though Japan has arguably done better than the United 
States in domestic policing, it is unlikely that the Patriot Act was modeled after Japan’s 
efforts.  As a homogenous society, Japan is able to utilize cultural traits in tipping the 
balance between effective policies and individual rights.  While this is not possible in the 
United States to the degree that Japan has been able to do, the United States may be able 
to reach more effective policies through public debate. 
The Japanese homeland security paradigm contains elements that the United 
States should avoid.  These elements are a tendency to focus on domestic policy and a 
                                                 
231 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 22. 
66 
taboo for investigating religious organizations.  In its battles against the JRA and Aum 
Shinrikyo, Japan had a tendency to ignore international cooperation prior to terrorist 
attacks and reacting by utilizing international cooperation.  An effective counterterrorism 
policy tries not to be reactive, but proactive.  This lesson is valuable for the United States 
as it reforms its bureaucracy to fight the GWOT.  The United States should also pay heed 
to Japan’s experiences with Aum Shinrikyo.  Although religious organizations should be 
respected, they must not be ignored or allowed to operate illegally.  This is another 
valuable aspect of the Japanese homeland security paradigm. 
What is surprising is how easy it could be for the U.S. bureaucracy to implement 
lessons gleaned from the Japanese homeland security paradigm.  Reducing the 
dependence on the use of the military national instrument of power in favor of other 
instruments is a policy decision that the President could implement.  Japan’s unique 
domestic policy may be impossible to implement in the United States, but what may be 
possible is public debate and initial policies that begin integrating U.S. law enforcement 
into the society.  By making U.S. law enforcement more accessible to the general public 
and creating a more positive image, steps in the Japanese direction can be made.  The 
United States, since 9/11, has focused its attention internationally to combat terrorism and 





A. U.S. PRIORITIES AND STRATEGY 
Currently, the top priorities for the United States include combating terrorism and 
ensuring that the U.S. homeland is secure against terrorist attacks.232  To achieve these 
goals, the U.S. has developed a “4D” strategy.233  The tenets of this strategy are: “Defeat 
terrorists and their organizations, Deny sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists, 
Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit, and Defend U.S. 
citizens and interests at home and abroad.”234     
B. GWOT PROGRESS TO DATE 
In a speech on October 6, 2005, President Bush summed up the results the 
administration has had to date in pursuing this strategy.  Some of these results include the 
United States and its allies having killed or captured most of the terrorists responsible for 
the 9/11 attacks, some of bin Ladin’s senior deputies, along with al Qaeda managers and 
operatives in more than 24 countries, the terrorist responsible for the USS Cole bombing, 
a senior Zarqawi terrorist planner, the mastermind behind both the Jakarta and first Bali 
bombings, and many of al Qaeda’s senior leadership that were in Saudi Arabia.  
Additionally, the United States has reorganized its government and reformed its 
intelligence agencies to improve homeland defense and track enemy activity.  These 
efforts, along with those of U.S. allies, have also resulted in the disruption of at least ten 
al Qaeda terrorist plots in the post 9/11 era.  Additionally, at least five al Qaeda attempts 
to case targets in the United States have also been stopped.  The United States and its 
allies have also claimed success for the termination of a nuclear technology black-market 
led by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan.  During this time frame, Libya gave up its long-
range ballistic missile, chemical weapon and nuclear weapons programs.  The 
Proliferation Security Initiative resulted in at least twelve shipments of suspected 
weapons technology being stopped.  This also included equipment for Iran’s ballistic 
missile program.  Other claims of success include the progress being made in 
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Afghanistan against the remnants of the Taliban and their al Qaeda allies, the work with 
Pakistan to defeat the militant extremists in that country, and the fight against terrorists 
and regime remnants in Iraq.235  Despite these claims of success, there are problems with 
the current strategy and claims. 
C. HOMELAND SECURITY PROBLEMS TO DATE 
As far as strategy is concerned, the 9/11 Public Discourse Project, established by 
the former members of the 9/11 commission, released reports on how the United States 
was progressing in its homeland security endeavors in the four years since the attacks on 
the United States.  Unfortunately, the results of these reports have been less than 
promising.  Out of 41 grades given by the project, only one area received an “A” and this 
grade was an “A minus”.  This grade was given for the Bush administration’s efforts in 
attacking terrorist financing.  The 9/11 Public Discourse Project gave “F’s” on homeland 
security spending in regards to cities most at risk, radio communications among 
emergency agencies, and airline passenger prescreening efforts.236  In addition to these 
poor grades, the project also feels that the sense of urgency that was apparent 
immediately after 9/11 has faded away and resulted in stalled efforts to make the United 
States safer.  The TSA is relaxing standards on airline passenger carry-ons.237  The 
allocations of homeland security funds are being criticized as new risk assessment based 
models are being used to distribute funds.238  Other problems include the struggle that 
U.S. government agencies have had in establishing and defining the criteria and standards 
that are required to measure organizational performance.239  In addition to these problems 
with U.S. strategy, there are also problems with the administration’s claims. 
The problems with the administration’s claims have to do with measurement 
issues.  Although the United States claims that $200 million has been confiscated from 
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terrorists, terrorists are still capable of raising money and transferring additional funds.  
Progress made by claiming the capture or eradication of terrorists does not mean that a 
terrorist organization has not grown or decentralized into a more “resilient adversary.”240  
Another issue has to do with unintended consequences and how to measure their impact.  
Some examples of these include “diverting scarce resources from one policy area to 
another, increasing spending and possibly adding to the budget deficit, or eroding civil 
liberties.”241  These problems in strategy and the measuring of anti-terrorism 
effectiveness create a dilemma. 
D. PROBLEMS WITH MEASURING HOMELAND SECURITY PROGRESS 
According to Hoffman and Morrison-Taw’s pre-9/11 qualitative research on 
countering terrorism, a comprehensive national plan is essential to the success of a 
counterterrorism campaign.  This plan should consist of an “effective overall command 
and coordination structure” with “‘legitimizing’ measures” that “must be taken by the 
government to build public trust and support, combined with anti-terrorist legislation 
sensitive to public sentiments” and “coordination within and between intelligence 
services,” and there must be “collaboration among governments and security forces of 
different countries.”242  The dilemma comes when comparing the claims of the Bush 
administration with the critiques of U.S. strategy in light of the importance of a national 
plan and its elements. 
A post-9/11 method of measuring homeland security progress can be obtained by 
utilizing two of Stephen Flynn’s “principles.”  His sixth principle is, “Deterrence Value 
of Homeland Security.”243  The simple theory is that if no attacks against the United 
States have taken place since 9/11, then the U.S. homeland security system is working.  
What if terrorists are only waiting for the opportune time to attack and it just has not 
happened yet?  Flynn’s first principle, “Fail Safe Security is Unachievable and 
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Counterproductive,” addresses this counterargument.244  This principle can be used to 
back up the U.S. government claims that homeland security progress is real and while it 
is not fail-safe, enough progress has been made to either prevent or deter attacks within 
the United States.  While this basic method of measuring success can be used, it does not 
imply that much more can be done to improve the system.  It is with these kinds of 
concerns that the United States should keep in mind the successes and failures of other 
countries in its battle against terrorism. 
E. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This thesis focused on the Japanese homeland security paradigm and how it can 
be applied to the United States in light of the insufficient responses following the 9/11 
attacks. 
Following the U.S. “4D” strategy, to “defeat terrorists and their organizations” the 
United States must use non-military policy instruments to “deny sponsorship, support and 
sanctuary to terrorists” and “diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to 
exploit” in addition to the military.245  Patience can also be used, but the United States 
needs to be careful of not falling into Japan’s pattern of always reacting slowly.  
Domestic policing will be key.  Proper policing will deny terrorists their sanctuary and 
support and also “diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit.”246  
The United States must avoid inconsistency.  This applies to policy and actions across the 
fight against global terrorism.  Different cultures and situations can result in different 
approaches and solutions to similar problems that two countries share.  Currently, the 
United States is involved in Iraq and Afghanistan.  North Korea is still a problem and 
rising Islamic radicalism is an increasing threat.  These reasons point towards reaching 
out and learning from other countries. 
While not all-inclusive, this thesis points out a road that the United States could 
follow.  The study of other countries and their approaches to the difficult challenge of 
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countering terrorism and its importance cannot be understated.  It is with this hope that 
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